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As members of the Research Committee at the Banco de España, we are pleased to announce the Fall 2016 issue 
of our Research Update, which aims to inform both academic and policy-oriented economists and financial 
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projects. First, an article by Manuel García-Santana, Josep Pijoan-Mas, Enrique Moral-Benito and Roberto 
Ramos presents evidence on the root causes of poor productivity growth in Spain prior to the Great Recession. 
Second, Bing Xu, Adrian van Rixtel, and Honglin Wang discuss data from China which suggest that informational 
advantages or market power may enable banks to demand more collateral from their borrowers. Finally, Henrique 
Basso and James Costain discuss possible institutional reforms to enhance fiscal sustainability in Europe, on the 
basis of a dynamic game-theoretic model.
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GROWING LIKE SPAIN: 1995-2007
MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO,  
JOSEP PIJOAN-MAS AND ROBERTO RAMOS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1609
The Spanish 1995-2007 growth experience
From 1995 to 2007, Spanish GDP grew at an average 
of 3.5% per annum, considerably above the EU average 
for the same period (2.2%). Despite this economic 
performance, annual total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth was -0.7%, which is low in comparison to that 
of the US (+0.6%) and the EU (+0.4%) over the same 
period. A standard growth accounting exercise reveals 
that this GDP growth was a consequence of factor 
accumulation (labor and capital), as is evidenced in 
Panel (a) of Figure 1 below.
Why did productivity behave so poorly in Spain during 
the boom years? One potential explanation for the 
decline in TFP could be the movement of resources 
from high productivity sectors to low productivity 
sectors, for example construction. The empirical 
evidence, however, suggests that this is not the main 
story. Panel (b) of Figure 1 plots a counterfactual TFP 
measure, calculated by keeping the shares of the 5 
largest sectors constant, equal to their values in 1995, 
alongside the evolution of the actual aggregate TFP 
measures in Spain and in the EU. While this 
counterfactual TFP measure (labeled TFPc in the graph) 
falls slightly more slowly than actual TFP, it still falls at 
an annual average rate of 0.4%, much closer to the 
actual 0.7% fall in Spain than to the positive 0.4% 
average growth rate of TFP in the EU.
Misallocation of factors and productivity from  
firm-level data
Given that reallocation of resources across sectors 
accounts only for a small portion of the TFP decline 
during 1995-2007, we are left with the hypothesis of a 
worsening in the allocation of resources across firms 
within sectors. To investigate this, we use firm-level 
administrative data (Central Balance Sheet Data or 
Central de Balances Integrada (CBI) in Spanish) on 
around 350,000 firms per year in manufacturing, 
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NOTE: Panel (A) shows the evolution of labor, capital, output and TFP during the 
period 1995-2007. Panel (B) shows the actual evolution of TFP in Spain (solid 
turquoise line) and the EU (solid blue line), and the counterfactual evolution of 
TFP in Spain if sectoral shares had remained constant to their values in 1995 
(dashed turquoise line). The source for all the series is EU-KLEMS.
construction, trade, and services for the period 1995-
2007. Slicing the data into 518 four-digit industries, we 
document two patterns.
First, the within-sector dispersion of productivities 
across firms increased sharply during the expansion. In 
a frictionless economy we should observe no dispersion 
in firm-level revenue productivities within each industry 
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– higher productivity firms should expand, attracting 
more capital and workers, which in turn would diminish 
their revenue productivity (either because of decreasing 
returns to scale or because of downward-sloping 
demand curves). Hence, dispersion of revenue 
productivities across firms is a symptom of a poor 
allocation of resources across firms. This is the idea 
behind the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), 
who estimate the disparity in efficiency levels between 
India, China, and the US, using firm-level data.
Our evidence implies that, had misallocation remained 
at its level in 1995, Spanish TFP would have grown by 
0.8% per year. This result means that technological 
progress did not come to a halt in Spain, but capital 
and labour were not assigned efficiently to the best 
projects within each sector. 
Second, firms’ growth during this period was inversely 
related to initial productivity. That is, during the boom 
years, low productivity firms were assigned more 
capital and labour than high productivity firms. As a 
result, the former outgrew the latter. Figure 2 displays 
this surprising pattern for a selection of six industries, 
but this result is widespread across most industries. 
Following Foster et al. (2006), industry productivity 
growth can be decomposed into four parts: (i) firms’ 
productivity growth weighted by size; (ii) firms’ size 
growth weighted by productivity; (iii) a cross-term 
capturing the interaction between firms’ productivity 
growth and size growth; and (iv) two extra terms 
capturing entry and exit.
The pattern documented in Figure 2 illustrates the 
second component of this decomposition, which turns 
out to explain the whole fall in industry productivity.
The deterioration of resource allocation across firms 
was pervasive across all industries, but there was 
substantial variation among them. We exploit this 
variation to shed some light on the possible factors 
behind the increase in misallocation.
We find that sectoral differences in financial 
dependence, in the ratio of equipment and structures 
in physical capital, in skill intensity, in tradability, and 
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NOTE: Relative TFP refers to the logarithm of firm-specific TFP relative to the industry average. Change in share refers to the difference in firm-specific market 
share measured in terms of value added.
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Conclusion
Spanish growth between 1994 and 2007 was based on 
the accumulation of capital and labor inputs that 
occurred despite an average annual decrease in 
productivity (as measured by TFP). This paper argues 
that the mentioned decline stems primarily from within-
sector misallocation of production factors across firms. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the industries that 
experienced more severe misallocation were those in 
which public sector influence is most crucial for 
business development. Specifying the channels 
through which public sector influence might contribute 
to resource misallocation is yet to be addressed.
REFERENCES
FOSTER, L., J. HALTIWANGER and C. KRIZAN (2006) 
“Market selection, reallocation, and restructuring in the 
US retail trade sector in the 1990s”, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 88(4): 748-758.
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1  While the largest deterioration of allocative efficiency 
corresponds to the construction sector (see Figure 3 in the 
paper), aggregate TFP losses from misallocation remain 
sizable even when construction firms are excluded from the 
sample.
in innovative content were unrelated to changes in 
allocative efficiency. Likewise, we find that the decline 
in allocative efficiency was present across all regions, 
and that regional differences in wage growth and 
house price growth were uncorrelated with the 
increase in distortions. These results undermine 
potential explanations by usual suspects such as 
financial frictions, dual labour markets, and lack of 
competition.
On the other hand, we find that industries in which the 
incidence of regulations is greater present productivity 
losses twice as large as those in the remaining sectors.1 
To be more concrete, we define two groups of industries 
according to the extent of public sector influence, 
either high or low. On aggregate, had the whole 
economy behaved like the low-incidence sectors, the 
overall TFP would have increased an extra 0.3% per 
year during 1995-2007.
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more asymmetrically distributed in concentrated 
banking markets (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; 
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2001). Hence, this paper examines 
whether inside information obtained through 
relationship lending, as well as informational 
advantages derived from concentrated market 
structures, allows banks to extract informational rents 
through collateral.
Using a unique dataset of loan-specific information 
including data on collateral for a large group of Chinese 
banks, we find that more intense lending relationships, 
and more concentrated markets, are both associated 
with a higher probability of collateral incidence. To the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate 
collateral incidence in Chinese bank lending markets 
with loan-level data. We then go on to present further 
evidence in favor of the informational rent extraction 
hypothesis. One key piece of evidence is that collateral 
incidence decreases after firms’ initial public offerings 
of equity (IPOs). While other papers have offered 
empirical evidence of informational rent extraction 
through lending rates (e.g. Hale and Santos, 2009; 
Schenone, 2010), our paper is the first to investigate 
rent extraction operating through collateral.
Identification strategy
The informational rent extraction hypothesis depends 
crucially on the existence of information asymmetries 
between inside and outside lenders. This suggests an 
intuitive way of testing the hypothesis: if inside banks 
extract informational rents through collateral, their 
ability to do so should be moderated after a shock that 
reduces information asymmetries existing between 
inside and outside banks. To this end, we follow 
Schenone (2010) and regard the equity IPO of borrowing 
firms as an information-releasing shock. In the course 
of the public offering and after being listed, previously 
private information about the firm will be released 
through compulsory listing requirements and 
subsequent regular financial reporting, public auditing, 
financial analysts’ research and stock price movements. 
As this new information becomes public, the 
informational monopoly position of inside banks is 
eroded and the adverse selection problem facing 
outside banks is alleviated, reducing the likelihood of 
rent extraction for loans granted after the IPO relative 
to loans granted before the IPO.
DO BANKS EXTRACT INFORMATIONAL RENTS THROUGH 
COLLATERAL?
BING XU, ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL AND HONGLIN WANG 
WORKING PAPER Nº 1616
While collateral is one of the defining characteristics of 
loan contracts, loan collateralization is more common in 
relationship lending than it is in loans to borrowers with 
whom the bank has no prior relationship. This paper 
argues that this finding may be evidence of informational 
rent extraction. Moreover, concentrated market 
structures may also facilitate rent extraction, as they 
promote asymmetries in firm-specific information 
among banks. Using unique loan-level data for China, 
we show that the positive association of relationship 
lending and bank market concentration with loan 
collateralization is less prevalent after firms’ equity IPOs, 
consistent with the idea that IPOs reduce informational 
asymmetries. Our results complement previous findings 
that banks extract informational rents by charging higher 
interest rates in relationship lending.
Introduction
Loan contracts are often backed by collateral, as a 
mechanism to guarantee full or partial repayment. 
Intuitively, then, one might expect banks to demand 
collateral more often in loans to new borrowers with 
whom they have no previous relationship. In this paper 
we show that, surprisingly, the opposite is true in the 
data. We find that the likelihood that loans are 
collateralized is positively associated with the strength 
of the relationship between the bank and the borrowing 
firm. This result suggests an alternative view of loan 
collateralization: it may be explained, at least partly, by 
informational rent extraction (Schenone, 2010). That is, 
we argue that there is an informational asymmetry 
between “inside banks” (those banks that are already 
lending to a firm) and “outside banks” (those which 
currently are not lending to a firm). As banks accumulate 
proprietary information about the borrowers with whom 
they have long-term lending relationships, they may 
use these informational advantages to “hold up” their 
borrowers (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). While outside 
banks are constrained by market pressures to offer 
more attractive loan conditions, inside banks may be 
able to demand more collateral, or exploit their 
informational advantages in other ways.
Besides relationship lending, the structure of bank 
lending markets may also create an asymmetric 
distribution of firm-specific information among lenders. 
The relevant literature suggests that information is 
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end, we test if the effects of relationship lending and 
market concentration on collateral incidence are less 
pronounced for more transparent firms, about which all 
lenders have good information. Specifically, we test the 
following equation:
P(Collateral il ) = F( β 0 + β 1 Sizeconcen il + β 2 ACR4 il + 
β 3 Sizeconcen il * Infor il + β 4 ACR4 il * Infor il + wInfor il + 
ρIPO il + ∑  j  α j Controls il ) (2)
where an informational transparency measure Infor il 
(higher value representing higher firm transparency) is 
interacted with Sizeconcen il and ACR4 il. If β 1 > 0 and 
β 3 < 0, (or respectively β 2 > 0 and β 4 <0 ), this would 
support the idea that relationship lending (respectively 
market concentration) facilitates informational rent 
extraction, and that rent extraction becomes more 
difficult when borrowers are transparent. We use two 
sets of transparency measures (Infor il ): transparency 
based on firm characteristics, and transparency linked 
to information generated by the stock market. The first 
set of transparency measures includes variables 
showing whether a firm is listed at the main board of 
the stock exchange, whether it is state-owned or is 
relatively large (e.g. all these firms should be more 
transparent). For the second group of stock-market-
related transparency variables, we postulate that firm 
transparency increases with the number of financial 
analysts following the firm and the percentage of shares 
held by non-bank institutional investors.
Subsequently, in step three we consider the possibility 
that equity IPOs act as information equalization shocks 
between inside and outside banks, in order to identify 
informational rent extraction. This motivates the 
following hypotheses. First, if relationship lenders 
extract informational rents through collateral, this will 
be more likely for loans originated before the equity IPO 
and less likely for those originated afterwards. Second, 
the positive correlation of market concentration with 
collateral should be mitigated by the informational 
shock of an equity IPO. 
To test these hypotheses, we interact the relationship 
intensity and market structure variables with the 
dummy variable IPO from equation (1), which yields:
P (Collateral il ) = F (β 0 + β 1 Sizeconcen il + β 2 ACR4 il +  
β 3 Sizeconcen il * IPO il + β 4 ACR4 il * IPO il + ρIPO il +  
∑  j  α j Controls il ) (3)
Informational rent extraction by relationship lenders is 
identified if β 1 > 0 and β 3 < 0. Similarly, market 
concentration facilitates informational rent extraction if 
β 2 > 0 and β 4 < 0. If β 3 < 0 or β 4 < 0 is rejected, the 
A crucial methodological concern is to control for 
changes in firm risk around the time of the IPO, and for 
differences in risk between listed and non-listed firms, 
so that changes in collateral incidence before and after 
the IPO can be attributed to changes in information 
asymmetries, rather than differences in firm risk. We 
control for this by incorporating firm risk characteristics 
from both before and after the IPO in our regressions, 
and we conduct additional robustness tests. To the 
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to apply 
equity IPOs as an identification strategy to test whether 
banks charge informational rents through collateral.
Methodology
Our main analysis consists of four steps. First, we 
investigate whether the likelihood of collateral incidence 
increases with relationship lending and market 
concentration, after controlling for many other firm and 
loan-specific determinants. Hence, we estimate the 
following Probit model as a first step: 
P(Collateral il ) = F( β0 + β1 Sizeconcen il + β 2 ACR4 il +  
ρIPOil + ∑  j  α j Controls il ) (1)
where i indexes for the firm and l for the loan number, 
and F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. The dependent variable 
Collateralil is a binary variable that equals one if loan l 
extended to firm i is collateralized, and is zero 
otherwise. The strength of bank-firm relationships is 
measured by Sizeconcenil , which is defined as the 
total amount that firm i previously borrowed from its 
current lender as a proportion of the total amount 
borrowed by the firm prior to the current loan. Market 
structure is measured by the concentration ratio 
ACR4il , defined as the share of total assets of the four 
largest banks as a percentage of the total assets of all 
banks in each province. We would expect a positive 
correlation of relationship intensity (Sizeconcenil ) and 
market structure (ACR4il ) with collateral: if β1 and β2 
are positive, this supports the idea that relationship 
lending and concentrated markets (respectively) 
facilitate informational rent extraction. IPOil is a dummy 
that equals one if a loan is issued after the borrower’s 
IPO and zero otherwise. Controlsil include additional 
features of relationship lending, firm and loan 
characteristics, monetary policy and regional macro-
economic factors, and various fixed effects.
As a next step, we investigate whether the likelihood of 
rent extraction through collateral, related to relationship 
lending and market concentration, is at least partially 
related to the informational “hold up” problem. To this 
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hence are associated with a higher likelihood of rent 
extraction through collateral. Fifth, using the firm risk 
measure Multiapp il , we find that once information 
about firm risk is made public after the IPO, rent 
extraction through collateral is moderated for safe firms 
but intensified for risky firms. This result is in line with 
the theoretical prediction of Rajan (1992) that informed 
banks are more able to extract rents from risky firms 
than from safer ones, and complements Hale and 
Santos (2009), who report similar results for lending 
rates. Finally, we find that riskier firms are more likely to 
pledge collateral, a result consistent with the “observed-
risk” hypothesis (e.g. Boot et al., 1991; Boot and 
Thakor, 1994). Furthermore, our evidence shows that 
private firms are much more likely to pledge collateral 
than state-owned firms, which complements previous 
findings that private firms in China are charged with 
higher lending rates in a state-dominant banking 
system (Cull and Xu, 2003; Allen et al., 2005). 
Overall, our findings are largely consistent with the 
informational rent extraction hypothesis. In the paper, 
we discuss whether our results might be biased by 
endogeneity of key explanatory variables, or whether 
other theories might explain our findings, but we do not 
find evidence to support either of these concerns. 
Future research
Our study opens up several avenues for future research. 
A cross-country investigation on rent extraction through 
collateral could be fruitful. Rent extraction through 
collateral could be more likely to occur in less developed 
markets where banks lack sufficient tools to price credit 
risks in comparison to more advanced markets. 
Another interesting question is whether banks choose 
different methods to charge rents (either through 
lending rates or collateral) depending on the degree of 
price regulation or the stance of monetary policy. A 
third avenue is to investigate how rent extraction 
through collateral could vary with the legal and 
institutional environment. We leave these questions for 
future work. 
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positive coefficients of β 1 and β 2 should be explained 
by other theories.
Finally, in step four we test more explicitly whether 
differences in firm risk may explain our results. Rajan 
(1992) suggested that inside banks can charge 
informational rents more easily from riskier borrowers 
than from safer ones, because outside banks will be 
less inclined to lend once the borrower is revealed as 
risky. This view suggests that when information 
asymmetries between inside and outside banks are 
reduced, rent extraction will decline for safer firms but 
not for risky ones. We test whether this prediction 
applies to collateral as well. We propose a novel 
measure of firm risk: Multiapp il , which equals one if the 
first IPO application of a firm was rejected by the 
Chinese markets regulator (the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, CSRC) and is zero otherwise. 
A firm’s listing request can be rejected by the CSRC on 
many grounds, such as cash-flow problems, uncertain 
or weak profitability perspectives, vague corporate 
governance structures or suspicious earnings, all of 
which suggest the potential existence of risk factors. In 
a way, this measure is similar to a credit rating (see 
Hale and Santos, 2009), though it is issued by a 
government body instead of a private rating company. 
To test these hypotheses, we expand (3) to include 
three-way interaction terms between informational rent 
variables (Sizeconcen il and ACR4 il ), IPO il , and the firm 
risk proxy Multiapp il .
Results and robustness tests
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, 
high relationship intensity and concentrated markets 
both imply that loans are more likely to be collateralized: 
β 1 and β 2 are significantly positive in equation (1). 
Second, these effects are less pronounced for 
transparent firms: β 3 and β 4 are negative in (2). 
Third, when applying equity IPOs as an informational 
shock, we find that for loans originated prior to the IPO, 
the likelihood of collateralization increases with 
relationship intensity, while this effect is greatly 
moderated for post-IPO loans: β 1 > 0 and β 3 < 0 in 
equation (3). In some specifications, relationship 
intensity is no longer significant in predicting collateral 
incidence for loans originated after the IPO. Fourth, the 
likelihood of collateral incidence increases with the 
degree of market concentration both before and after 
the equity IPO, but the effect is moderated for post-IPO 
loans: β 2 > 0 and β 4 < 0 in equation (3). This finding 
supports the hypothesis that concentrated markets 
facilitate information asymmetries among lenders and 
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FISCAL POLICY DELEGATION IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT
HENRIQUE S. BASSO AND JAMES COSTAIN
European economies urgently need better mechanisms 
to ensure sustainability of their high and volatile 
sovereign debt. This article discusses recent research 
pointing to a possible reform of European fiscal 
architecture— delegating some fiscal instruments to an 
independent institution— that might help restrain debt 
levels while maintaining scope for stabilization of 
economic and financial shocks.
Fiscal sustainability remains a pressing concern in the 
Eurozone. To a macroeconomist, this is unsurprising, 
because when a country joins a monetary union, 
several forces converge to increase both the level and 
the volatility of its sovereign debt. From Mundell (1961) 
to Obstfeld (2013), economists have observed that 
member states of a monetary union react more strongly 
to demand shocks and to cross-country financial flows; 
lacking an independent monetary policy, their fiscal 
policy is left to play a more prominent role in stabilizing 
the economy. Moreover, Beetsma and Bovenberg 
(1999) and Chari and Kehoe (2007) have argued that 
joining a monetary union creates fiscal free-riding 
problems that increase deficit bias, causing debt to 
trend upwards over time.
Delegating fiscal instruments
Going forward, several institutional alternatives are 
commonly recognized for Europe. Quoting Tirole 
(2015), 
Oversimplifying, there are three strategies for the 
Eurozone: … return to national currencies …  
the current approach based on the Maastricht treaty 
… and, finally, the more ambitious version of 
federalism. My own clear preference is for the 
federalist version but I’m not at all convinced that 
Europeans are ready to make it work successfully.
Our research explores a fourth alternative: the 
delegation of one or more fiscal instruments to an 
independent authority mandated to maintain long-run 
budget balance, just as modern democracies have 
delegated control of monetary policy instruments to 
independent central banks. Obviously, fiscal policy is 
complex and multidimensional, and most fiscal 
decisions, especially normative and redistributive ones, 
should remain under the control of the government 
itself. But since maintaining long-run budget balance 
could in principle be structured as a technical and 
quantitative task, this aspect of fiscal policy might be 
better handled by an agency independent of the 
government. This could eliminate the “deficit bias” that 
comes from democratic politics, just as central bank 
independence has reined in “inflation bias”.
The idea of delegating some fiscal decisions to an 
institution independent of government is not new; 
Blinder (1997) and Wyplosz (2005) outline two 
contrasting perspectives. Part of the job of an 
independent fiscal authority would be monitoring 
budget trends and advising the government about the 
sustainability of its policies. But its job could be 
extended by granting it control over some across-the-
board fiscal shift variable. For example (following 
Gruen, 1997), the government might define a baseline 
income tax code, specifying the types of income to be 
taxed, the types of exemptions and deductions, and a 
set of baseline tax rates applicable at different income 
brackets. But the tax code could also include a shift 
factor X, which would multiply all the baseline rates, 
and could mandate that the value of X should be set by 
an independent budget agency. Setting X = 1 would tax 
all income at the baseline rates, but the agency would 
be mandated to raise or lower X as necessary to keep 
debt trending towards a long-run target. A broad shift 
parameter of this type would be a powerful lever to 
maintain fiscal sustainability, in a transparent way, while 
minimizing the distributional consequences of the fiscal 
authority’s decisions.
A dynamic game between policy institutions
While various policy proposals have advocated 
delegating fiscal instruments, our work provides the 
first formal, theoretical comparison of delegation, 
relative to other fiscal regimes. To understand 
delegation, we compare games in which different sets 
of institutions, controlling different sets of instruments, 
interact in the policy-making process, against the 
backdrop of a reduced-form macroeconomic model. 
We make just two simple assumptions about 
institutional behavior, distilling consensus findings from 
the political economy literature.1 First, we assume that 
1  Lacking a clear practical definition of what “commitment” 
means, in institutional terms, we don’t assume “rules” are 
followed. We think it makes more sense to model different 
types of institutions by imposing systematic differences in 
their preferences, and then studying discretionary equilibria.
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wide fiscal authority, may bring additional welfare 
gains, though we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the authority might actually go too far, driving debt and 
inflation even lower than a social planner would prefer. 
Dynamic results
However, these steady-state results beg a number of 
questions that can only be addressed in a fully dynamic 
analysis. In ongoing work (Basso and Costain, 2016B), 
we study a dynamic, stochastic version of our policy 
game in order to address the initial transition costs of 
delegating fiscal instruments, the stabilization of fiscal 
shocks in the delegation scenarios, and the implications 
of different assumptions about the precise nature and 
timing of fiscal decisions.2 Our quantitative example is 
based on the pessimistic but not unreasonable 
assumption that Eurozone debt has not yet reached its 
long-run steady-state. We assume, for illustrative 
purposes, that steady-state debt in the monetary union 
is two times annual private output (roughly 160% of 
GDP), accompanied by 10% annual inflation.3 Table 1 
compares institutional scenarios in our numerical 
example. 
Compared with the planner’s solution, government 
impatience implies excessive debt in scenario I (71% of 
private-sector output, compared with 0% in scenario P). 
Inflation is also too high, because without commitment 
the central bank is tempted to stimulate output and to 
inflate away the excessive public debt. In scenario M, 
these biases are reinforced by free-riding problems: 
member state governments fail to internalize the impact 
of their debt on the interest rate r(d) and on the central 
bank’s incentives, so debt almost triples compared with 
scenario I. Debt and inflation decline strongly if national 
fiscal authorities are established (scenario Fj), because 
these authorities are patient and because they dislike 
debt accumulation more than the governments do. 
elected policy-makers are less patient than society, 
reflecting the pressures of representative democracy. 
Second, reflecting the experience of inflation-averse 
independent central banks, we assume that an 
institution mandated to achieve a clearly defined, 
quantitative goal will prefer that goal more strongly 
than society does.
In a recent paper (Basso and Costain 2016A), we analyze 
the long-run, steady-state implications of fiscal policy 
delegation in a monetary union where each member 
government must respect its own intertemporal budget 
constraint. Imposing the institutional preference 
assumptions mentioned above, we compare 
discretionary policy games representing the following 
scenarios:
– P: first-best social planner
–  I: a single economy with its own independent 
central bank
–  M: a monetary union with a single independent 
central bank
–  Fj: a monetary union with a single independent 
central bank and an independent fiscal 
authority in each member state
–  F: a monetary union with a single independent 
central bank and a single independent fiscal 
authority
We identify three distinct channels by which delegation 
of long-run budget balancing responsibilities to an 
independent fiscal authority tends to reduce debt, 
relative to scenario M. The first channel is the debt 
aversion induced by the fiscal authority’s mandate; the 
second is its greater patience, compared to an elected 
government. Third, a fiscal authority established at the 
union-wide level will internalize common pool problems. 
Thus, making a few natural parameter assumptions, we 
can rank steady-state debt levels d S and inflation rates 
π S analytically across scenarios S, as follows: 
 dP < dI < dM πP < πI < πM
 dP < dFj < dM πP < πFj < πM
 dF < dFj  πF < πFj
Steady-state social welfare follows the opposite 
ranking of debt and inflation. Hence society is 
unambiguously better off in scenario Fj, relative to 
scenario M. Moving to scenario F, with a single union-
2  Calculating the welfare effects of permanent institutional 
changes and of shocks in the same model requires a fully 
nonlinear, global solution. We find the policies that satisfy 
policy-makers’ Euler equations, approximating the policy 
functions as fourth-order Chebyshev polynomials. Given the 
policies we then iterate backwards to calculate value 
functions too.
3  We calibrate a high steady-state inflation rate because, as 
Leeper (2010) argues, unsustainable fiscal policy can cause 
monetary policy to eventually lose control of inflation. In 
reality, high debt may be more likely to lead to default, 
rather than sustained inflation. But since our model abstracts 
from default, steady-state inflation stands in here for all the 
long-run costs of debt.
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M by another regime S, starting from the steady state 
debt of the monetary union. In our simulation, the gains 
from implementing regimes Fj or F are roughly 
equivalent to a permanent 14% increase in private 
sector output. Comparing columns three and four, the 
initial austerity cost is large (around 4% of permanent 
output), but the efficiency gains overwhelm these 
costs, so the net benefit is large and positive. In the 
paper we also demonstrate that our welfare rankings 
are robust to changes in our assumptions about the 
precise sequence of fiscal decisions.
An important concern about delegating budget 
balancing responsibilities is the possible tradeoff with 
macroeconomic stabilization. Since stabilization policy 
requires fiscal deficits from time to time, a regime that 
avoids debt accumulation might be expected to suffer 
more from economic fluctuations. In the fifth column of 
the table, we compare the effects of a large, mean-
reverting increase in the demand for public spending (a 
shock e 0 > 0 that might reflect, for example, the fiscal 
costs of cleaning up a financial crisis) across regimes S. 
Strikingly, the total welfare loss W S (d S,e 0 ) - W 
S (d S,0) 
caused by this shock is largest in the monetary union, 
and smallest in the fiscal delegation regimes Fj and F. To 
understand this result, Figure 1 graphs the implied 
impulse responses. As expected, the monetary union 
smoothes this shock through deficit financing; in the first 
three periods of impact private output and 
contemporaneous utility fall less in regime M than in any 
other regime. But this drives up debt substantially, 
increasing inflation incentives; so from the fourth period 
onwards, private output, public spending, and 
instantaneous utility are all lowest in scenario M. The last 
panel of the figure shows that the cumulated utility loss 
is largest in scenario M, consistent with column five of 
Table 1. Intuitively, coming closer to the commitment 
solution can decrease the intertemporal welfare impact 
of shocks in the fiscal delegation regimes, in spite of 
greater “austerity” at the moment the shock hits.
Debt falls further towards the planner’s preferred level 
in scenario F, because a single European fiscal authority 
would internalize debt-related common pool problems. 
We write intertemporal social welfare W S in scenario S 
as a function of public debt d and the public sector 
demand shock e. Welfare differences across regimes 
(stated as equivalent variations of private output) are 
large: inhabitants of the monetary union would value 
jumping to the steady state of the planner’s solution 
just as much as a permanent 19.4% increase in private 
sector output. Likewise, the fiscal delegation scenarios 
imply much higher steady-state welfare than the status 
quo (equivalent to an 18.4% or 18.7% output increase), 
almost matching the gains from the social planner’s 
solution.
Considering the reduced-form nature of our model, 
these numbers should be taken as a qualitative 
illustration of the effects of fiscal delegation, rather 
than a serious quantitative assessment of those effects. 
Nonetheless, the finding that these welfare gains are 
orders of magnitude larger than Lucas’ (1987) estimate 
of the cost of business cycles is not surprising, because 
interest payments on sovereign debt are subtracted off 
of national income, directly affecting consumption. 
Hence, the welfare difference between scenarios M 
and S (expressed in consumption units) is at least as 
large as the steady state change in the interest burden, 
r (d M ) d M - r (d S) d S. And besides the change in interest 
payments, moving from scenario M to any of the other 
scenarios implies a large decrease in tax distortions 
and inflation.
Of course, inhabitants of the monetary union might not 
be willing to pay down their initial debt to realize these 
potential long-term gains. But the fourth column of the 
table shows that delegating fiscal instruments is 
preferred, even from an ex ante perspective. We report 
W S (d M,0) - W M (d M,0), the gains from replacing regime 
                                        
Scenario Debt (a) Inflation Welfare (b) Transition gain (b) Crisis cost (b)
dS πS WS (dS,0) WS(dM,0)-WM(dM,0) W  (dSS ,e0)-W
S(dS,0)
0%.20.1%P   +19.4% +14.8% -0.75% 
4.17I %  7.0%  +15.3% +12.2% -0.78% 
7%.991M 10.0% 0 0 -0.90% 
9%.71jF   5.8% +18.4% +14.1%  
7%.8F   5.6% +18.7% +14.2%  
Dynamic resultsSteady state results
TABLE 1COMPARING INSTITUTIONAL SCENARIOS
a Debt expressed as a fraction of annual private sector output.
b Welfare differences expressed as equivalent variations of steady-state private sector output.
-0.75%
-0.75%
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risk (for example, a Eurobond scheme, or a shared 
European deposit insurance system). Recent 
institutional reforms have already laid much of the 
groundwork for delegation: all EU members have 
created independent national fiscal monitoring 
agencies, and following the “Five Presidents’ Report” 
(Juncker et al., 2015) the Commission is setting up a 
European Fiscal Board (by 2017) to further oversee 
national budget trends. Thus, both member states and 
the EU have or are developing the forecasting 
infrastructure necessary to control a delegated fiscal 
instrument. While long run national budget balance 
could be guaranteed by a national authority, delegation 
to a European authority seems more likely to credibly 
support a quid pro quo between core and periphery. 
Note also that when a state voluntarily delegates 
budget balance lever(s) to Europe, it could tailor this 
instrument to its own preferences. While a shift 
parameter could be defined in the tax code, it could 
alternatively be defined on the spending side (Costain 
and de Blas, 2012).
Europe has responded to recent crises by adding 
further layers of complex fiscal rules with complex 
escape clauses. While offering an appearance of 
Implications for Europe
Our simulations suggest that the gains from delegating 
budget balancing instruments are plausibly large, and 
contrary to our initial expectations, we find no tradeoff 
against stabilization policy. While one might naively 
hope to see delegation undertaken unilaterally, it is 
more relevant to ask how fiscal delegation could fit into 
a politically viable solution to ongoing instability in 
Europe. Current debt levels leave many Eurozone 
members, both “peripheral” states and major 
economies such as France and Italy, vulnerable to a 
rise in risk premia or renewed banking instability that 
could make their sovereign burdens unsustainable. 
These economies remain dependent on pledges and 
asset purchases by the ECB, but fiscally stronger 
members fear that any ECB protection creates moral 
hazard, encouraging weaker members to postpone 
reforms and budget cuts. 
This dilemma points to a mutually beneficial agreement 
between core and periphery: voluntarily delegating 
budget balancing instruments to a European institution 
could be a prerequisite for joining European 
mechanisms to protect against sovereign or financial 
IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A PUBLIC SPENDING DEMAND SHOCK FIGURE 1
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greater budget credibility, this may be an illusion. 
Defining broad-based fiscal shift parameters, and 
delegating their control to a European authority, could 
guarantee budget balance in a simpler, more 
transparent, and hence more credible way, which might 
lay the foundations of a deeper Fiscal Union.
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THE EFFECTS OF US UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES 
IN LATIN AMERICA
FRUCTUOSO BORRALLO, IGNACIO HERNANDO AND JAVIER VALLÉS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1606
This paper offers an empirical analysis of the way in 
which US unconventional monetary policy has affected 
Latin American countries. First, we estimate the effects 
of US monetary policy announcements on sovereign 
bond interest rates, exchange rates and stock market 
indices for a set of emerging countries, including five 
Latin American economies. We find that QE 
announcements in 2008/2009 and the “tapering talk” in 
2013 generated sizable sovereign yield and exchange 
rate fluctuations. We further find some excess response 
of Latam asset prices that disappear once we take into 
account their country characteristics. In the second part 
of the paper we estimate a simple model that measures 
the influence of country-specific macroeconomic 
fundamentals on the transmission of US financial 
disturbances. An estimated model including the inflation 
rate, the CDS spread, the ratio of official reserves and 
market capitalisation explains some of the observed 
cross-country heterogeneity of spillovers from US 
monetary policy announcements. Under this model, a 
greater impact from the normalisation of US monetary 
policy can be expected in Latin America relative to other 
emerging economies. 
DO THE RICH (REALLY) CONSUME HIGHER-QUALITY GOODS? 
EVIDENCE FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE DATA
VINCENZO MERELLA AND DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1607
Using average import prices (unit values) as proxies for 
quality, a large body of the international trade literature 
finds both theoretical and empirical support for the 
positive relationship between importer income and 
quality of imports. Several authors, however, argue that 
the empirical evidence of the link between income and 
product quality might be spurious, since import prices 
could be affected by other factors than product quality. 
This paper takes into account this issue with a new 
theoretical and empirical approach. Building on 
Khandelwal’s (2010) discrete choice model approach, 
where quality is inferred by quantitative market shares 
as well as unit values, we develop a model that allows 
for willingness to pay for quality to vary with income. 
We empirically validate the theoretical relationship 
between importer income and product quality by using 
the Eurostat’s COMEXT database, which collects 
customs data reported by EU countries at 8-digit 
disaggregation. Our estimations support the positive 
link between consumer income and product quality, 
which is also robust across sectors.
MEASURING MARKET LIQUIDITY IN US FIXED INCOME 
MARKETS: A NEW SYNTHETIC INDICATOR
CARMEN BROTO AND MATÍAS LAMAS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1608
We propose a new synthetic liquidity indicator that 
summarises the data on a broad set of market liquidity 
measures both for sovereign and corporate fixed 
income markets in the US. Our index is based on 17 
variables that cover the main dimensions of market 
liquidity. The methodology used to calculate the index 
consists of two steps. First, a transformation of the 
individual liquidity measures is made, based on the 
methodology proposed by Holló et al. (2012) for the 
CISS (Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress). The 
transformed variables are then weighted using a 
principal component analysis. The indicator shows 
that liquidity in US fixed income markets has been 
impaired after the global financial crisis, mainly as a 
result of weaker liquidity conditions in US Treasury 
markets, whereas those in the corporate debt market 
remained stable.
GROWING LIKE SPAIN: 1995-2007
MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO,  
JOSEP PIJOAN-MAS AND ROBERTO RAMOS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1609
See Features section.
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funding activity in some cases. The results are robust to 
alternative econometric specifications and to different 
definitions of covered and uncovered cost savings.
MODELLING INTEREST PAYMENTS FOR MACROECONOMIC 
ASSESSMENT
CELESTINO GIRÓN, MARTA MORANO, ENRIQUE M. QUILIS,  
DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA AND CARLOS TORREGROSA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1612
In this paper we present a methodology designed to 
estimate the future path of the interest payments of 
central government. The basic idea is to represent in a 
compact way the joint dynamics of debt liabilities and 
interest payments as a function of four elements: the 
initial outstanding amounts of debt, the expected primary 
funding needs, the expected yield curves and the 
expected issuance strategy to be followed by the 
government. The procedure is amenable to scenario-
based simulation and produces a detailed representation 
of the debt term structure. We provide results for the 
period 2015-2025.
GROWING BY LEARNING: FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE ON THE 
SIZE-PRODUCTIVITY NEXUS
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1613
It is a well-known empirical regularity that small firms 
are less productive than large firms. However, does 
size cause productivity or vice versa? Using matching 
methods, I find that productivity shocks are followed by 
significant increases in size defined by employment. In 
contrast, size shocks are not followed by productivity 
gains at the firm level. This finding casts doubt on the 
conventional wisdom that aggregate productivity in 
Spain is driven by a firm size distribution biased 
towards small firms in comparison with other developed 
countries. According to my findings, low firm-level 
productivity might play a crucial role in shaping the 
Spanish firm size distribution.
BREAKING DOWN WORLD TRADE ELASTICITIES: A PANEL ECM 
APPROACH
JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN
WORKING PAPER Nº 1614
This paper exhaustively analyses the recent decline of 
international trade elasticities to output growth. We 
extend an empirical model of import demand functions 
to account not only for transitory factors, such as 
relative prices and import intensity-adjusted measures 
LAS REFORMAS DE LA LEY CONCURSAL DURANTE LA GRAN 
RECESIÓN
MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA AND RAQUEL VEGAS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1610
Traditionally, bankruptcy procedures in Spain have 
been lengthy and costly processes that have nearly 
always (95%) resulted in the liquidation of the insolvent 
firm. These dysfunctions became apparent with the 
large increase in bankruptcy filings during the crisis 
that started in 2008 and the ensuing congestion of the 
courts. In order to resolve these and other problems, 
the Bankruptcy Law has been reformed several times. 
The goal of this research is to analyse the impact of 
these reforms on two facets: the length of bankruptcy 
procedures and the probability of achieving a successful 
reorganisation, hence avoiding the firm’s liquidation. 
Our findings show that two of the four reforms analysed 
increased the percentage of reorganisations and 
decreased bankruptcy duration through improving the 
quality of insolvency administrators and by fostering 
out-of-court workouts for large corporations.
THE DRIVERS OF EUROPEAN BANKS’ US DOLLAR DEBT 
ISSUANCE: OPPORTUNISTIC FUNDING IN TIMES OF CRISIS?
LUNA AZAHARA ROMO GONZÁLEZ
WORKING PAPER Nº 1611
This paper provides a comprehensive investigation of the 
determinants of US dollar denominated long-term debt 
issuance by European banks. The database used allows 
the drivers of foreign-currency issuance identified in the 
literature, including variables at the individual firm (e.g. 
bank) level, to be explored. The analysis covers overall 
US dollar issuance as well as Yankee debt issuance, 
which is defined in this paper as bonds denominated in 
US dollars issued in domestic US markets by non-US 
issuers. In addition, issuance determinants are 
investigated during both crisis and non-crisis periods. 
The main findings are the following. European banks 
issue US dollar debt to naturally hedge their US dollar 
assets (with US dollar exposures obtained from BIS 
international banking statistics), but they also make 
extensive use of deviations in covered interest parity and 
even in uncovered interest parity, particularly after the 
crisis. There is also evidence that banks issue in US 
dollars for strategic reasons and that heightened volatility 
has a negative impact on US dollar issuance. Bank-
specific variables are also relevant drivers of US dollar 
debt issuance: banks with higher asset growth, with a 
banking subsidiary in the United States and with a high 
credit rating are more likely to issue in US dollars than 
others. Bank-specific structures, as captured by deposit 
and loan ratios, also have a relevant impact on US dollar 
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CREDIT CONTRACTIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT
MIHÁLY TAMÁS BORSI
WORKING PAPER Nº 1617
This paper investigates the impact of private credit 
contractions on labor market performance. Impulse 
responses for total, youth, and long-term unemployment 
are estimated using local projections for a panel of 20 
OECD countries over the period 1980-2013. The 
empirical findings suggest that a decline in private 
credit can generate sizable and statistically significant 
increases in all three unemployment measures. On 
average, credit contractions in the sample increase 
total unemployment rates by nearly 1 percentage 
point at the peak. This effect is even stronger for 
youth unemployment. The persistent impact on long-
term unemployment emphasizes the sluggish recovery 
of labor markets following a credit downturn. The 
results also reveal that increases in joblessness depend 
heavily on the scale of the build-up in financial leverage 
prior to the onset of a contraction. Specifically, 
excessive credit booms tend to be followed by a signifi 
cantly larger rise in unemployment in the subsequent 
bust phase. Moreover, credit contractions associated 
with rigid labor market institutions lead to 
disproportionately greater increases in unemployment. 
These findings underline the important relationship 
between disruptions in the credit market and 
unemployment fluctuations.
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS ACROSS THE CREDIT CYCLE
MIHÁLY TAMÁS BORSI
WORKING PAPER Nº 1618
This paper studies the differences between fiscal 
multipliers in OECD economies across the credit cycle. 
Impulse responses are obtained using a state-
dependent model with direct projections, in which 
multipliers depend on the state of credit markets. 
Identification of the effects of fiscal stimulus and 
austerity measures is achieved by distinguishing 
between unanticipated increases and decreases in 
government spending. The empirical results imply that 
the financial environment matters. Expansionary fiscal 
policies are associated with large multipliers during 
credit crunch episodes, and spending increases 
likewise foster economic growth in periods of rapid 
credit expansion, albeit to a lesser extent. In contrast, 
the output effect of contractionary fiscal policies is 
never statistically different from zero. Regime-specific 
multipliers of the individual components of GDP and 
the unemployment rate suggest that reductions in 
public expenditure should help constrain the economy 
during unsustainable credit booms, whereas spending 
of demand (I-O Tables), but also for habitually neglected 
permanent factors such as protectionism, vertical 
integration (i.e. Global Value Chains) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Dealing with a non-stationary 
heteregenous panel of 27 countries, we estimate a 
panel Error Correction Model from 1960 to 2015 in 
order to break down world trade elasticities. Our main 
findings evidence: i) the presence of panel (cointegrating) 
structural changes in the trade-to-GDP relationship in 
2000 and 2009, private consumption being a source of 
disruption; ii) although investment and exports are the 
most sensitive, import-intensive components of 
demand, this is far from being transitory, which is 
clearly weighing on the current slowdown; iii) the 
relevant contribution of GVCs shows a procyclical 
pattern, questioning the permanent nature of the 
current levelling-off of vertical integration processes. 
The lack of progress in reducing import tariffs and the 
usual discarded, complementary relationship between 
FDI and imports have a residual role. All in all, our 
results have substantial policy implications, as they 
reinforce the idea of a historical break towards a new 
‘normal’ trading phase.
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, SERVICES DEEPENING,  
AND THE TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY
ALESSANDRO GALESI AND OMAR RACHEDI
WORKING PAPER Nº 1615
Advanced economies are undergoing a structural 
transformation from manufacturing to services. We 
document that structural change comes with a process 
of services deepening: over time, both services and 
manufacturing become more intensive in service 
inputs. We argue that structural transformation and 
services deepening affect the transmission of monetary 
policy by increasing the relative importance of services, 
which have stickier prices than manufacturing. We 
study the implications of the U.S. sectoral reallocation 
with a New Keynesian model with two sectors 
connected by an input-output matrix, which varies 
endogenously over time. The rise of services dampens 
the responses of aggregate and sectoral inflation rates 
to a monetary policy shock. The changes in the 
responses of sectoral inflation rates are entirely driven 
by services deepening.
DO BANKS EXTRACT INFORMATIONAL RENTS THROUGH 
COLLATERAL?
BING XU, ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL AND HONGLIN WANG 
WORKING PAPER Nº 1616
See Features section.
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there are macroprudential instruments particularly 
suited to countries within a single monetary area such 
as the euro area. Further, the current situation with 
countries inside and outside the Monetary Union 
applying different macroprudential policies, offers 
unique opportunities to test whether or not these 
policies should be the same in all the member 
countries and at all times.
PAGOS INMEDIATOS: ¿EVOLUCIÓN O REVOLUCIÓN?
ANA FERNÁNDEZ AND SERGIO GORJÓN
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 30, MAY 2016, 63-90
The authors analyse the operation of retail payment 
services and, in particular, of instant payments, with a 
special focus on the transformative effect on the way in 
which financial institutions relate to their customers in a 
context of increasingly digital services. The article 
emphasises that, within the Single Euro Payments Area 
(SEPA), efforts and initiatives are focused on avoiding 
reintroducing market fragmentation through 
digitalisation. This requires cooperation in drawing up 
common rules and developing a pan-European 
interoperability framework. The present roadmap 
envisages that instant payments will be a reality in 
Europe by the end of next year. The Spanish financial 
industry foresees that its operations will be fully 
consistent with the rules defined for SEPA and covering 
the whole of the European Union by that same date.
LOS BONOS GARANTIZADOS Y LAS TITULIZACIONES: 
SITUACIÓN ACTUAL, MARCO GLOBAL Y PERSPECTIVAS 
FUTURAS
ASUNCIÓN ALONSO VENTAS AND JOSÉ MANUEL  
MARQUÉS SEVILLANO 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 30, MAY 2016, 91-106
The authors analyse the recent behaviour of and 
developments in the covered bond and securitisation 
markets. In the case of the covered bond market, 
which has better withstood the effects of the financial 
crisis, important design innovations are discerned, 
including the incorporation as collateral of new types 
of assets, and structures that improve liquidity 
management. In the securitisation market, which has 
been more affected by the crisis, structures are being 
promoted that are simpler and more transparent than 
those normally used in the past. The future of these 
markets will depend upon the regulations eventually 
established, and thus the paper reviews the current 
debates and initiatives regarding such regulations in 
the European and global context. 
increases in financial recessions should facilitate the 
repair of private sector balance sheets in order to revive 
market confidence and boost economic recovery. 
FINANCIAL STABILITY JOURNAL
The Financial Stability Journal (Revista de Estabilidad 
Financiera) is a half-yearly journal published by the 
Banco de España that aims to act as a platform for 
communication and dialogue regarding issues related 
to financial stability, with a particular focus on prudential 
regulation and supervision. Its board of editors 
comprises internal and external professionals. All 
articles appearing in the journal, which may be authored 
by Banco de España staff or researchers from other 
institutions, are refereed by at least one member of the 
board of editors.
PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE US AND EUROPE: EFFICIENCY, 
SOUNDNESS AND CHALLENGES
SANTIAGO CARBÓ-VALVERDE AND CHARLES M. KAHN
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 30, MAY 2016, 9-33
This paper examines the recent changes in, and future 
outlook for, wholesale and retail payment systems in 
Europe and in the United States. While some 
convergence in payment institutions and patterns of 
use is observed, the differences between United States 
and Europe persist, especially in the retail market. A 
possible explanation for the divergences is the different 
regulatory structure in the two areas, and looking ahead 
it is worth enquiring whether such differences may 
have consequences in terms of recent innovations in 
the payments area, in the so-called “fintech” revolution. 
The article concludes that the regulatory challenge in 
the field of payment institutions is to find a suitable 
balance in terms of innovation and security between 
the interests of the traditional payment service providers 
and those of the new players. 
SPANISH BOOM-BUST AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
ÁNGEL ESTRADA AND JESÚS SAURINA 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 30, MAY 2016, 35-61
This article reviews the experience of the Spanish 
economy over the past 15 years to draw some 
conclusions on macroprudential policy implementation. 
The Spanish experience, mainly through the establishment 
of countercyclical provisioning, demonstrates that 
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GROWTH EMPIRICS IN PANEL DATA MODELS UNDER MODEL 
UNCERTAINTY AND WEAK EXOGENEITY
E. MORAL-BENITO
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 31 (3),
APRIL/MAY 2016, 584-602
NETWORKS AND THE DYNAMICS OF FIRMS’ EXPORT 
PORTFOLIO: EVIDENCE FOR MEXICO
J. DE LUCIO, R. MÍNGUEZ, A. MINONDO AND F. REQUENA
THE WORLD ECONOMY 39 (5),  
MAY 2016, 708–736
SPAIN: FROM MASSIVE IMMIGRATION TO VAST EMIGRATION?
M. IZQUIERDO, J.F. JIMENO AND A. LACUESTA
IZA JOURNAL OF MIGRATION 5 (10),  
MAY 2016
MEASURING MARKET LIQUIDITY IN US FIXED INCOME 
MARKETS: A NEW SYNTHETIC INDICATOR
C. BROTO AND M. LAMAS
SPANISH REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 14 (1),
JANUARY-JUNE 2016, 15-22
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS IN TURBULENT TIMES:  
THE CASE OF SPAIN
P. HERNÁNDEZ DE COS AND E. MORAL-BENITO
EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS 50 (4),
JUNE 2016, 1589-1625
FISCAL DELEGATION IN A MONETARY UNION WITH 
DECENTRALIZED PUBLIC SPENDING
H. S. BASSO AND J. COSTAIN
CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES 62 (2),  
JUNE 2016, 256-288
THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEBT ACROSS EURO AREA COUNTRIES: 
THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS, INSTITUTIONS 
AND CREDIT CONDITIONS
O. BOVER, J.M. CASADO, S. COSTA, P. DU CAJU, Y. MCCARTHY,  
E. SIERMINSKA, P. TZAMOURANI, E. VILLANUEVA AND T. ZAVADIL
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CENTRAL BANKING 12 (2),  
JUNE 2016, 71-129
RECENT PUBLICATIONS  
IN REFEREED JOURNALS
HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND UNCERTAINTY:  
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION
A. ESTRADA, D. GARROTE, E. VALDEOLIVAS AND J. VALLÉS
MONETARIA, 3, 
JANUARY-JUNE 2015, 71-109
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS AND BEYOND
P. HERNÁNDEZ DE COS, T. WARMEDINGER  
AND C. CHECHERITA-WESTPHAL
HACIENDA PÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA/REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA  
PÚBLICA 215 (4),
DECEMBER 2015, 139-168
EL EMPLEO Y LOS SALARIOS PÚBLICOS DURANTE LA CRISIS: 
ANÁLISIS DESDE UNA PERSPECTIVA INTERNACIONAL  
Y REGIONAL
PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO  
AND JAVIER J. PÉREZ
PAPELES DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA Nº 147, 
FEBRUARY 2016
EFFICIENT ESTIMATION OF UNCONDITIONAL CAPITAL  
BY MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
A. FERRER, J. CASALS AND S. SOTOCA
FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS 16,
FEBRUARY 2016, 75-84
EL IMPACTO ECONÓMICO DE LA ACTIVIDAD NORMATIVA.  
LOS RIESGOS DE LA «GRAN CONVERGENCIA»
J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI AND S. SALVADOR
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA INDUSTRIAL 398,
2015, 117-128
PROTECCIÓN DEL EMPLEO Y FLUJOS DEL MERCADO  
DE TRABAJO EN ESPAÑA: EFECTOS DE LAS REFORMAS DE  
2010 Y 2012
A. L. GÓMEZ JIMÉNEZ
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA LABORAL 13 (1),  
MARCH 2016, 34-62 
THE RESPONSE OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH TO THE RISK  
OF JOB LOSS: EVIDENCE FROM DIFFERENCES IN SEVERANCE 
PAYMENTS
C. BARCELÓ AND E. VILLANUEVA
LABOUR ECONOMICS 39,  
APRIL 2016, 35–54
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FORTHCOMING ARTICLES  
IN REFEREED JOURNALS
LAS REFORMAS DE LA LEY CONCURSAL DURANTE LA GRAN 
RECESIÓN
M. GARCÍA-POSADA AND RAQUEL VEGAS
CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA
CREDIT, CRISIS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH LOAN MARKET
J. S. MORA-SANGUINETTI, M. MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE  
AND M. GARCÍA-POSADA
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
THE CYCLE OF EARNINGS INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM 
SPANISH SOCIAL SECURITY DATA
S. BONHOMME AND L. HOSPIDO
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
THE IMPACT OF THE 2011 SHORT-SALE BAN ON FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH STOCK MARKET
O. ARCE AND S. MAYORDOMO
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
LEARNING FROM THE GREAT DIVERGENCE IN UNEMPLOYMENT 
IN EUROPE DURING THE CRISIS
T. BOERI AND J. F. JIMENO
LABOUR ECONOMICS 41,  
AUGUST 2016, 32-46
ENVY AND HABITS: PANEL DATA ESTIMATES  
OF INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES
F. ÁLVAREZ-CUADRADO, J. M. CASADO AND J. M. LABEAGA
OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 78 (4),  
AUGUST 2016, 443–469
POLICY SPILLOVERS AND SYNERGIES IN A MONETARY UNION
O. ARCE, SAMUEL HURTADO AND CARLOS THOMAS
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CENTRAL BANKING 12 (3),
SEPTEMBER 2016, 219-278
THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL OF UNCONVENTIONAL 
MONETARY POLICY: THE IMPACT OF THE VLTROS ON CREDIT 
SUPPLY IN SPAIN
M. GARCÍA-POSADA AND MARCOS MARCHETTI
ECONOMIC MODELLING 58,
NOVEMBER 2016, 427-441
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NEWS
DEPUTY GOVERNOR FERNANDO RESTOY APPOINTED CHAIR  
OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY INSTITUTE AT THE BIS
The Banco de España congratulates its Deputy 
Governor, Fernando Restoy, who has been appointed 
as Chair of the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel. Mr. 
Restoy will assume this new position on January 1, 
2017, replacing Czech central banker Josef Tosovsky. 
Mr. Restoy’s new appointment continues a distinguished 
career in financial research, supervision and regulation. 
He is a graduate in Economics and Business Studies 
from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, an MSC 
in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics from the 
LSE, and an MA and PhD in Economics from Harvard 
University. In 1991, he joined the Department of Monetary 
and Financial Studies of the Banco de España, eventually 
heading the Financial Studies Unit, and then directing 
the department from 2001 until 2007. During these years 
he published numerous academic and policy-oriented 
studies, in journals such as Journal of Finance, Review 
of Finance, and European Economic Review. 
In 2007 he joined the Board of the Comisión Nacional 
del Mercado de Valores (the Spanish National Securities 
Market Commission), becoming Vice Chairman of this 
institution in 2008. In that position he played a leading 
role in several European and international bodies 
concerned with securities regulation and accounting 
standards, including the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). In 
2012 he was appointed Deputy Governor of the Banco 
de España and since January 2014 he has been a 
member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB’s Single 
Supervisory Mechanism. Among other recent duties as 
Deputy Governor, from 2012 to 2015 Mr. Restoy chaired 
the FROB, the Spanish Fund for the Orderly Restructuring 
of the Banking Sector. He is currently Vice-Chairman of 
the Governing Committee of this Fund. 
About the FSI and the BIS
The Financial Stability Institute was established in 1999 
in Basel under the aegis of the BIS, with the objective of 
supporting supervisors globally in their task of improving 
and strengthening financial systems. The FSI pursues 
this objective by promoting best supervisory standards 
and practices, assisting in their proper implementation, 
and disseminating relevant information and analyses on 
products, practices and techniques to help supervisors 
adapt to rapid innovations in finance.
The Bank for International Settlements, founded in 
1930, is the world’s oldest international financial 
organization. Headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, the 
BIS sustains and supports central banks’ efforts to 
achieve monetary and financial stability, promoting 
cooperation among monetary authorities and financial 
supervisors from all continents. To this end, it hosts 
many international financial regulatory committees, 
such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), the Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS) and the Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures (CPMI). The BIS also hosts independent 
organizations such as the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), and the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers (IADI).
Profile of deputy governor Fernando Restoy
NEWS AND EVENTS
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4TH WORLD BANK – BANCO DE ESPAÑA RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE. LABOR MARKETS: GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY 
AND INEQUALITY
MADRID, 16-17 JUNE 2016
On June 16-17, the Banco de España hosted the 
conference “Labor Markets: Growth, Productivity and 
Inequality”, which it organized jointly with the World Bank. 
The conference consisted of five sessions, as well as a 
policy panel and a keynote speech by Professor David 
Card (Univ. of California, Berkeley). The presentation by 
Prof. Card emphasized the need to take account of 
differences in firms’ characteristics in order to understand 
outcomes in the labor market. The five sessions addressed 
various aspects of the labor market. The first considered 
the macroeconomic implications of changes such as 
increases in the minimum wage and the automation of 
production processes; the second evaluated the effects 
of regulations and inefficiencies on labor market 
outcomes. The third session was devoted to human 
capital, and to different forms of insurance for workers. 
The last two sessions studied the implications of trade 
globalization and migration flows, and the impact of 
various government programs to improve job quality. At 
the policy panel, the four speakers presented their views 
on the issues in labor markets requiring further research.
FIRST JOINT RESEARCH WORKSHOP
MADRID, 5 OCTOBER 2016
On the morning of October 5, 2016, the Banco de España 
and the Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros 
(CEMFI) celebrated their first Joint Research Workshop. 
Two economists from each institution presented their 
recent research to an audience drawn from the two 
institutions and from the local economics community. 
The Banco de España and CEMFI anticipate that 
workshops of this type will be repeated regularly in the 
future, in order to strengthen ties and promote joint 
projects between the institutions.
2nd SEMINAR IN ECONOMIC HISTORY
MADRID, 06 OCTOBER 2016
On 6th October the Banco de España held the second 
edition of its Economic History workshop. The 
workshop aims to bring together academics and 
central bankers in order to discuss some recent 
RECENT CONFERENCES
LINK TO CONFERENCES PAGE
JOINT BANCO DE ESPAÑA / BARCELONA GSE POLICY WEEK. 
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY: XXI CENTURY
MADRID, 6-8 JUNE 2016; BARCELONA, 9-10 JUNE 2016
In June, the Banco de España and the Barcelona 
Graduate School of Economics jointly organized a pair 
of conferences under the title “Fiscal Sustainability: XXI 
Century”. Ensuring fiscal sustainability is a central 
challenge in the context of reforming the macroeconomic 
policy framework in Europe. The Joint Policy Week 
brought together researchers from academia and from 
policy institutions to address topics including the 
measurement of fiscal sustainability, fiscal rules and 
other mechanisms for enforcing long-run budget 
balance, and the interaction of monetary, fiscal, and 
financial stability policies in macroeconomic models, 
with special attention to the European context. 
The first event, at the Banco de España in Madrid, 
focused especially on applied policy questions. Speakers 
on Monday, June 6 addressed the impact of fiscal 
consolidation and the stabilization properties of different 
fiscal instruments; finally Prof. Athanasios Orphanides 
(Massachussetts Institute fo Technology) delivered a 
keynote address on the fiscal implications of 
unconventional monetary policies. The second day’s 
presentations on political economy aspects of fiscal 
discipline, and the potential costs of default and breakup, 
complemented a panel discussion between five senior 
European policy makers: Agnes Benassy (Council of 
Economic Advisers, France), Robert Chote (Office of 
Budget Responsibility, UK), Jean-Pierre Vidal (Advisor to 
President Donald Tusk), Torsten Arnswald (Ministry of 
Finance, Germany), and Juan Rojas (European Stability 
Mechanism). On Wednesday, after sessions on monetary 
and fiscal policy interactions and sovereign risk premia, 
the closing address by Prof. Enrique Mendoza (Univ. of 
Pennsylvania) reviewed different theoretical definitions of 
fiscal sustainability, and assessed current prospects for 
sustainability in the US and Europe.
The second event, at the Univ. Pompeu Fabra in 
Barcelona on 9-10 June, had a more academic 
perspective. This workshop, which formed part of the 
Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, featured sixteen 
presentations of recent theoretical work on monetary 
and fiscal policy interactions.
Conference webpage: Madrid
Conference programme: Barcelona
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 RESEARCH UPDATE, FALL 2016
RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
SEMINARS
LINK TO SEMINARS PAGE
EFFECTS OF DIFFERENTIATED SCHOOL VOUCHERS: EVIDENCE 
FROM A POLICY CHANGE AND DATE OF BIRTH CUTOFFS 
PATRICIA NAVARRO
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 
13 JAN 2016
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT SIZE: EVIDENCE 
FROM SPAIN
CARLOS SANZ ALONSO 
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 
14 JAN 2016
ESTIMATING VOLATILITY SHOCKS 
CARLOS MONTES 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 
15 JAN 2016
FROM HYPERINFLATION TO STABLE PRICES: ARGENTINA’S 
EVIDENCE ON MENU COST MODELS 
ANDRÉS NEUMEYER
UNIV. TORCUATO DI TELLA, 
15 JAN 2016 
THE MARGINS OF GLOBAL SOURCING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
FROM U.S. FIRMS 
POL ANTRAS 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 
18 JAN 2016
HOUSING, DEBT AND GROWTH 
VALERIO SCALONE 
LUISS, 
19 JAN 2016
THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON INCOME MOBILITY 
MARIO ALLOZA FRUTOS 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON, 
21 JAN 2016
research on economic history. This year, the workshop 
included a presentation by María Loreto de Inclán 
about the Archives of the Banco de España, and a 
plenary talk by Nicholas Crafts.
The first session was devoted to the two research projects 
carried out by the most recent holders of the Banco de 
España’s economic history research grants. These 
studies analyzed money demand in Spain during the 
period 1883-1998, and the sovereign debt crisis of the 
Habsburg monarchs in the period 1557-1647. The 
second session covered two research papers by 
economists from the Banque de France (BdF) analyzing 
the role of the BdF as a lender of last resort in 19th 
Century France, and the monetary operations of the Bank 
of England during the Napoleonic Wars. Finally, the third 
session included two works by academics about the 
comparative welfare of post-dictatorship Ibero-American 
countries, and an analysis of the links between health and 
welfare in Western Europe over the period 1900-1950.
The plenary talk by Professor Crafts, from the University 
of Warwick, was entitled “The Great Depression: lessons 
for policy today” and it analyzed some of the key 
elements of the Great Depression in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, including the role of the 
Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort, the impact of 
monetary policy, and the effects of the New Deal 
programs. At the end of the workshop participants were 
invited to visit the archives.
14TH EMERGING MARKETS WORKSHOP: SPILLOVERS AND 
SPILLBACKS FROM MAJOR TRANSITIONS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY
MADRID, 17-18 NOVEMBER, 2016
The Emerging Markets Workshop (EMW), organized 
alternatingly by several Eurosystem Central Banks, has 
been running for more than a decade. Since its creation 
in 2003, this workshop series has served as a platform 
for debate for central bank researchers working on 
macroeconomic and financial issues related to emerging 
market economies. In this occasion it took place on 17-
18 November 2016 in Madrid, Spain, at the Banco de 
España headquarters. This year’s edition addressed the 
evolving nature of the interconnections between 
advanced and emerging markets economies, in the light 
of a number of major economic transitions that are 
taking place in the global economy (China’s transition to 
a new growth model, the end of the commodities 
supercycle, or the slow normalization of monetary policy 
in the US). It focused, in particular, on how emerging 
market economies could influence developed markets, 
a new global feature arising from the last financial crisis.
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LIQUIDITY PROVISION: LESSONS FROM A NATURAL 
EXPERIMENT 
VICENTE BERMEJO 
UNIV. CARLOS III, 
02 FEB 2016
DODGING ROBIN HOOD: RESPONSES TO FRANCE AND ITALY’S 
FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAXES 
MARIA COELHO 
UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, 
03 FEB 2016
ARE DEVALUATIONS EXPANSIONARY? FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE 
FROM ESTONIA
CHRISTIAN PRÖBSTING
UNIV. OF MICHIGAN, 
08 FEB 2016 
EXPECTATIONS FORMATION AND INVESTMENT DURING 
RECESSIONS 
LUIS ROJAS 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, 
09 FEB 2016
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMMODITY BOOMS  
AND BUSTS: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
SAMER SHOUSHA
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 
10 FEB 2016
BANKRUPTCY REFORMS WHEN WORKERS EXTRACT RENTS 
ALESSANDRO PERI 
UNIV. CARLOS III, 
12 FEB 2016
CREDIT CONTRACTIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
MIHALY BORSI 
UNIV. OF ALICANTE, 
12 FEB 2016
HOW DOES ACCESS TO THE UNSECURED DEBT MARKET 
AFFECT INVESTMENT?
KIZKITZA BIGURI 
UNIV. AUTÓNOMA DE BARCELONA, 
15 FEB 2016
MONETARY POLICY, PRIVATE DEBT AND FINANCIAL  
STABILITY RISK 
ELEONORA GRANZIERA 
UNIV. OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 
22 JAN 2016 
CREDIT SUPPLY SHOCKS, CONSUMER BORROWING  
AND BANK COMPETITIVE RESPONSE: EVIDENCE FROM  
CREDIT CARD MARKETS 
SERGIO CORREIA 
DUKE UNIVERSITY, 
25 JAN 2016
HEALTH POLICIES AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 
YULIYA KULIKOVA 
UNIV. AUTÓNOMA DE BARCELONA , 
25 JAN 2016 
DEALING WITH DEALERS: SOVEREIGN CDS  
COMOVEMENTS 
SERGIO MAYORDOMO 
UNIV. OF NAVARRA  
26 JAN 2016
FOLLOWING THE TREND: TRACKING GDP WHEN  
LONG-RUN GROWTH IS UNCERTAIN 
IVAN PETRELLA 
UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, 
27 JAN 2016
VIOLATING THE LAW OF ONE PRICE:  
THE ROLE OF NON-CONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY 
MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ 
UNIV. OF NAVARRA, 
29 JAN 2016 
SEARCH AND MULTIPLE JOBHOLDING
NELLIE ZHAO
CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 
01 FEB 2016
AN EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE IN THE FIRST AGE OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
CARLOS VAN HOMBEECK
UNIV. OF MARYLAND, 
01 FEB 2016
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THE SAFETY TRAP
EMMANUEL FAHRI
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 
05 APRIL 2016 
BAD TIMES, GOOD CREDIT 
BO BECKER
STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, 
06 APRIL 2016
STAGNATION TRAPS 
LUCA FORNARO
CREI, 
13 APRIL 2016 
CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN SOUTH EUROPE 
CAROLINA VILLEGAS
ESADE, 
21 APRIL 2016 
MORE ON THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL
PEDRO TELES
BANK OF PORTUGAL AND CATOLICA LISBON SBE, 
27 APRIL 2016 
MONETARY POLICY PASS-THROUGH AND HETEROGENEOUS 
BANK LENDING 
MATTEO CICCARELLI
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 
04 MAY 2016 
THE ROLE OF LEARNING FOR STOCK PRICES AND BUSINESS 
CYCLES 
FABIAN WINKLER
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 
11 MAY 2016 
HOW EXCESSIVE IS BANKS’ MATURITY TRANSFORMATION? 
ANATOLI SEGURA
BANCA D’ITALIA, 
17 MAY 2016 
HOW FIRMS ACCUMULATE INPUTS: EVIDENCE FROM IMPORT 
SWITCHING
ASIER MARISCAL
UNIV. OF ALICANTE, 
18 MAY 2016
MONETARY POLICY AND THE ASSET RISK-TAKING CHANNEL 
DOMINIK THALER 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, 
16 FEB 2016
DENSITY FORECAST EVALUATION IN UNSTABLE 
ENVIRONMENTS 
GLORIA GONZÁLEZ-RIVERA
UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE, 
22 FEB 2016 
REDISTRIBUTION AND STABILIZATION OF INCOME  
PER CAPITA OF HOUSEHOLDS BY REGIONS
JOSE MARÍN 
AIREF, 
29 FEB 2016 
DO HIGHER CORPORATE TAXES REDUCE WAGES?  
MICRO EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY 
SEBASTIAN SIEGLOCH
UNIV. OF MANNHEIM, 
02 MARCH 2016 
DYNAMIC DEBT DELEVERAGING AND OPTIMAL MONETARY 
POLICY 
PIERPAOLO BENIGNO
LUISS, 
09 MARCH 2016
FISCAL CONSOLIDATION UNDER IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY
JESPER LINDE
SVERIGES RIKSBANK, 
11 MARCH 2016 
EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSMISSION OF THE ECB’S BALANCE 
SHEET POLICIES
JEF BOECKX
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM, 
16 MARCH 2016 
THE CREDIT SCORING CHANNEL IN THE SUBPRIME CONDUIT 
MORTGAGE MARKET
JAIME LUQUE
UNIV. OF WISCONSIN, MADISON, 
18 MARCH 2016
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THE ILLUSION OF SCHOOL CHOICE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
FROM BARCELONA 
CATERINA CALSAMIGLIA
CEMFI, 
25 MAY 2016 
THE EFFECT OF STATE TAXES ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL 
LOCATION OF TOP EARNERS: EVIDENCE FROM STAR 
SCIENTISTS 
ENRICO MORETTI
UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, 
31 MAY 2016 
MACROECONOMIC CO-MOVEMENT, SINGULARITY, AND (MIS)
SPECIFICATION OF ECONOMIC MODELS
MICHAL ANDRLE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
03 JUNE 2016 
DEBTOR PROTECTION, CREDIT REDISTRIBUTION, AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY 
GERALDO CERQUEIRO
CATÓLICA LISBON, 
09 JUNE 2016
RISK DIVERSIFICATION AND THE LARGE-SMALL BANK 
DICHOTOMY IN MONEY MARKETS 
HUGO RODRÍGUEZ
INSTITUTO DE ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO, MOVE, 
15 JUNE 2016 
THE FORWARD GUIDANCE PUZZLE 
MARCO DEL NEGRO
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 
28 JUNE 2016
DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL BUSINESS CYCLES INTERDEPENDENCE 
DANILO LEIVA
BANCO CENTRAL DE CHILE, 
29 JUNE 2016 
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PROFILES 
AITOR LACUESTA
Division Head
Structural Analysis Division 
DG Economics, Statistics and Research
PEOPLE
Aitor Lacuesta was recently appointed as Head of the 
Structural Analysis Division at the Banco de España. 
Aitor is a microeconomist and labor economist, 
holding a Licenciatura in economics from the Univ. 
Autónoma de Barcelona, a Master’s from CEMFI, and 
a Ph.D. from the Univ. of Chicago. His research has 
addressed issues such as immigration, brain drain, 
wages and inequality in Spain and elsewhere. 
RU: Tell us about your background, and about the career 
path that led to your appointment to lead the Structural 
Analysis Division. 
It was during my studies at CEMFI that I found I 
enjoyed research, and I felt that I could succeed at it, 
so I applied for the Ph.D. program at the University 
of Chicago. I spent five years there, where I 
specialized in labor economics and microeconometric 
techniques, under the supervision of Casey Mulligan, 
Steven Levitt, and Robert Lalonde. My dissertation 
was on migration, which was a hot topic at the time 
because Spain was experiencing a mass immigration 
inflow. So the Banco de España was interested in 
my work, and I joined the Labor Markets Unit in the 
Economic Analysis and Forecasting Department, a 
place where I could combine good research with 
interesting policy and forecasting work. 
RU:  The recent restructuring regrouped that unit to create 
the new Structural Analysis Division. Could you tell us about 
the new division?
The new Structural Analysis Division seeks to 
address the relation between labor costs, margins 
and competitiveness, so it combines the Labor 
Market Unit with the Competitiveness Unit that 
monitors product markets and studies the external 
sector. Labor markets and product markets together 
affect the competitiveness of the economy, so there 
is a natural relation to the external sector. 
So that’s the division I am in charge of now. We 
basically report on three important aspects of the 
economy. We play a role in the forecasting exercise, 
by providing inputs on labor market conditions and 
on the external sector. And we also provide input 
when the Banco de España takes positions on 
structural issues and structural reforms in the 
Spanish economy. 
RU: Your first main research topic was immigration, which 
has been really dramatic in the Spanish economy in recent 
years. Could you tell us about migration trends, both before 
the crisis and what’s happened since then? 
Traditionally, of course, Spain was a source of 
emigrants. In the 1960s we exported labor to the 
rest of Europe, and to South America. As income 
levels grew in Spain, most of those flows stopped. 
From the 1990s we began to attract immigrants, 
which was a new phenomenon. The flows were 
amazing: around 2005 Spain attracted more people, 
in absolute numbers, even than the United States. 
We saw annual inflows of seven to nine hundred 
thousand people, which was incredible in for a 
country so much smaller than the US. 
That immigration was fueled by the types of work 
available here in Spain, where many low-skilled jobs 
were available, related both to construction and to 
service sectors such as tourism and also household 
help as Spanish women’s labor force participation 
grew. There were plenty of jobs for immigrants, 
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though simultaneously some migrants with more 
skills were settling for low-skilled jobs in those 
sectors. But that boom came to a halt with the crisis. 
RU: How much of that immigration flow has been reversed 
since the Great Recession? 
In 2009-2010, the first flows out of Spain were 
mostly recent immigrants. There was a vigorous 
reverse flow almost immediately. But an important 
observation right now is that immigration trends are 
persistent. Once you start to attract immigrants, 
those trends will remain for some time, because the 
inflow creates a network of friends and relatives 
who help provide opportunities for new immigrants 
from the same sources. Even in 2011-2012 we still 
saw inflows of three hundred thousand or more, 
even while jobs were being destroyed in the Spanish 
economy. But by that time the net flow was already 
large and negative, with more emigration than 
immigration, especially towards South American 
countries like Ecuador and Colombia, where 
conditions were improving. 
RU: So in spite of the prominent media coverage of Spanish 
emigration, quantitatively most of the action has been on 
the side of recent immigrants? 
Initially the outflow of native Spaniards was tiny. In 
terms of nationality, we began to see emigration of 
Spanish citizens, but many of them were in fact 
recent Latin American immigrants who had received 
Spanish passports on the basis of their ancestry. 
Many Spanish citizens at that point had been born 
elsewhere, and some of them left because they still 
had ties and opportunities outside Spain. 
But the nationals born in Spain have only begun to 
emigrate very slowly. Flows are still low, forty to fifty 
thousand emigrants per year. But we are beginning 
to worry that this flow seems to be increasing. Even 
though job prospects are now improving in Spain, 
emigration of native-born Spaniards is still 
increasing, now that overseas networks have been 
established. 
RU: Besides migration, you have also studied Spanish wage 
trends in detail, pre- and post-crisis. Tell us what you have 
learned. 
Labor market trends illustrate a key problem with 
our labor market institutions, and the way the 
market adjusts. Unfortunately, we observe that 
nominal wages often don’t respond at all to shocks, 
and therefore all the adjustment ends up being on 
the quantity of employment. 
For example, it was astonishing in 2008 and 2009, 
at the beginning of the crisis, with massive job 
destruction, wages were still growing at a 3% 
annual rate. That’s a sign of a labor market that is 
sick, that’s not working the way a market should. 
Obviously if firms’ costs are increasing right when 
their demand plummets, they will be forced to fire 
more people. And that’s what we observed. 
RU: It is often argued that Spanish wages are sticky, and it is 
also argued that Spain has high wage inequality. Is there 
any inconsistency between those two claims? 
The Spanish income distribution has traditionally 
been more dispersed than other countries. What 
our data show is that this is not caused by firms 
offering variable wage structures. Instead, it’s 
because worker and job characteristics are very 
dispersed. In terms of education it is clear, we have 
a very polarized distribution of educational 
attainment. 
Likewise, there is the question of labor market 
duality— we are one of the most segmented 
countries in the world. There is huge wage 
differentiation between temporary and permanent 
contracts, so that duality is reflected in a dispersed 
wage distribution. 
The same with productivity variance and other 
measures of product market inefficiency. 
Productivity is highly variable across firms, and this 
translates into wage dispersion. So there are many 
job characteristics, probably often related to 
regulatory distortions, that make the populations of 
workers and firms in Spain especially heterogeneous, 
which is then reflected in the distribution of wages. 
As a consequence, movements of inequality have 
been traditionally explained by changes in the 
composition of those who work and are unemployed. 
On the other hand, within the population of 
employees the bargaining system is very rigid, so it 
is hard for firms to create a wage structure that 
differentiates across people depending on their 
effort or pays differently from other firms. Indeed 
when we survey firms and ask about the fraction of 
variable compensation that they offer, the 
percentage is tiny by international standards.
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RU: How has inequality evolved, during and after the crisis? 
Inequality is growing more in the income distribution 
than in the wage distribution. Again, it reflects 
changes in workforce composition. Above all, as 
people have fallen into unemployment, this 
increases income inequality in the middle and lower 
part of the distribution. That’s the most important 
factor. And potential cushions against those shocks, 
such as other household members entering the 
labor market, or public subsidies or other forms of 
insurance, besides emigration which would also be 
a way of self-insuring, haven’t compensated this 
huge unemployment shock. 
But also, wage inequality is accentuated by labor 
market duality— wages have fallen more for workers 
on temporary contracts than for those with 
permanent contracts. We are thinking of including a 
chapter in our next Annual Report to try to 
disentangle the quantitative importance of different 
factors driving increasing inequality.
RU: When temporary contracts were first introduced, they 
seemed like a useful way to address labor market rigidities, 
don’t you think? In the 1990s, they helped reduce 
unemployment. 
We should not forget that the labor market situation 
today reflects previous policy decisions. Temporary 
contracts were introduced in the 1980s and 
liberalized in the 1990s in response to periods of 
extreme youth unemployment. And many young 
people entered the labor market for the first time 
when those contracts became available. 
But what looked like a solution at that time now 
generates many other problems. In particular, many 
people are trapped in rotation between temporary 
jobs, without a chance to move up into a permanent 
contract, and any adjustment to shocks falls on 
their shoulders. That is also a practical problem in 
terms of productivity, because neither workers nor 
firms have incentives to invest in relationships they 
both expect will be temporary, thus giving rise to a 
very inefficient system. And while wages were 
already quite rigid, the new dual labor market made 
firms rely even more on adjusting labor quantities 
rather than adjusting nominal wages in response to 
shocks. 
RU: You did a study on the effects of the latest labor market 
reform, in 2012. From an economic perspective, what do 
you think were the main innovations in that reform, and are 
those changes actually having an impact? 
The latest reform tried to tackle both the big 
interrelated problems we have been discussing: 
high wage rigidity, and a highly segmented system 
of contracts. According to our research, I would say 
that the reform had bigger effects on wage flexibility 
than on duality. But still, at the current juncture, 
wage differences do not fully offset productivity 
differentials across firms.
RU: The reform was intended to allow firm-specific 
bargaining, no? 
In principle, yes. A firm-specific bargain now has 
legal priority over the sectoral bargain. But in practice 
we have not seen much change in the percentage of 
firms signing firm-specific agreements. 
As best we can tell, this shows that reaching a firm-
specific agreement is costly. It is costly to take 
some workers out of their regular jobs to spend time 
bargaining with the firm, and to provide them with 
all the information they need to begin bargaining. 
So firms may prefer to adopt the sector agreement 
instead of facing those costs. But it remains a big 
question mark, why we haven’t observed more firm-
specific bargains. 
RU: And what about the effects on duality? 
In terms of duality, the reform clarified the distinction 
between “economic” dismissals, which come with a 
lower severance payment, and “noneconomic” 
dismissals. Also, the severance payment was 
reduced from 45 days’ pay per year worked, to 33 
days, in the “noneconomic” case. Still there is an 
important gap. Dismissals cost 12 days of 
compensation, per year worked, in the temporary 
contract, versus 20 days per year worked for 
“economic” separation of a permanent contract, 
going up to 33 days per year worked if a permanent 
contract separates for other reasons. 
RU: We have talked a lot about labor markets, but your 
division also monitors productivity, both at the firm level and 
in the aggregate. Productivity dispersion across firms is 
surprisingly high in Spain, and it’s been increasing over 
time. Do you have some hypotheses about the causes? 
Yes, that is something we have been studying closely 
in the division. When we started looking at the drivers 
of low aggregate productivity growth in Spain, we 
found that the main factor was a worsening of the 
allocation of resources across firms. Between 1995 
and 2007, the firms that were experiencing the fastest 
sales growth were the ones with lowest productivity. 
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these problems are associated with the weak 
average firm level productivity observed in Spain. 
Finally, we must explore demand side factors 
affecting investment at the firm level, given the 
weak of investment rates in the Euro Area in spite of 
lax financing conditions. 
RU: In terms of competitiveness, Spanish exports have done 
extremely well recently. Which sectors are prospering, 
besides tourism of course?
Well, tourism is obviously huge in the Spanish 
economy, but actually the improvement is pretty 
general. Right now, Spain is gaining export share in 
many sectors, even those facing competition from 
some emerging regions. We have also been 
exploring which product quality levels are growing. 
As in other European countries, most of our exports 
are in medium and high quality segments. But 
currently Spain is even expanding in low quality 
segments, where there is fierce overseas 
competition. 
And likewise we are gaining market share in most 
regions. We attribute that both to decreasing labor 
costs and lower financial costs, which have induced 
many new firms to start exporting. Of course, 
exporting is also a response to weak internal 
demand. But the good thing is that once you get 
started, there is a lot of persistence. It is much 
easier to continue once your exports get a foothold 
in other markets. So we expect the strong export 
trends to continue for some years. 
RU: So what is the division’s research agenda on 
competitiveness? 
Now, on the competitiveness side, our main 
question is whether recent improvements in the 
current account are structural or cyclical. And there 
are several projects now on that side, studying 
firms’ reaction to demand shocks and other types 
of shocks, and whether firms are switching between 
imported and domestic intermediate goods. 
Also with a long run view, we are analyzing the way 
the sectoral specialization of Spain favors our 
country’s external position with respect to 
developments of global value chains, offshoring 
processes and more generally world demand 
changes due to ageing and other global trends.
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That’s really a counterintuitive finding. In quantitative 
terms, this misallocation of resources was draining 
0.7 percentage points from annual productivity 
growth rates. 
We are struggling to understand that trend in 
misallocation. One observation is that financing, 
prior to the crisis, was not going to very productive 
firms. Since the recession, that has changed. But 
prior to the crisis there was no correlation between 
productivity and the probability of getting credit. 
Some research conducted at the Banco de España 
sheds light on these issues, focusing on the role of 
regulatory barriers to perfect competition or that of 
fixed costs associated with particular intermediate 
inputs such as electricity or the judicial system. 
Right now we are trying to figure out which of those 
effects is quantitatively the most important, and 
whether they might be related. 
RU: Given these challenges for the Spanish economy, what 
do you see as the research agenda for your division, both on 
the labor markets side, and on the product market side? 
What projects do you have in mind? 
On the labor side, there are two important questions 
to study now relating to unemployment. One technical 
question that matters for us as central bankers, is 
how to measure the degree of slack in the economy. 
Do we only focus on unemployment? Or should we 
also keep track of activity indicators, or changing 
population trends? This is important in practical 
terms— recently we updated our unemployment 
forecast because we finally incorporated more 
demographic factors into our model, taking account 
of rapid population ageing. That affects how much 
slack there is, how many workers may eventually find 
jobs again. And that alters the relation between 
employment and inflation, so it is core business for 
our division. 
A second issue is how to recover the huge stock of 
unemployed workers as active participants in the 
economy. We often debate the effects of active 
versus passive labor market policies, but we don’t 
really have enough empirical evidence about this. Is 
training really achieving anything? Are subsidies to 
social security contributions actually achieving 
anything? 
On the product market side we need to monitor 
competition indicators in order to assess whether 
Spain has a general problem of product competition 
across sectors or it is concentrated in particular 
sectors. Moreover, we need to understand how 
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NEW FACES
MARIO ALLOZA
Conjuctural Analysis Division
DG Economics, Statistics and Research
MARIO ALLOZA joined the Conjunctural Analysis 
Division at the ADG Economics and Research in 
September 2016, after obtaining his PhD in 
Economics from University College London. He 
attended the universities of Burgos and Valladolid 
as an undergraduate student, and holds an MSc 
degree in Economics from Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra and a Master’s degree in Financial Economics 
from Universidad Complutense. Prior to joining the 
Banco de España, Mario worked as a research 
analyst at FEDEA, as a research assistant at IESE 
Business School and as an intern at the Research 
Department of BBVA. During his PhD studies, he 
has also worked as a research and teaching 
assistant, obtaining several teaching awards.
Mario is an applied macroeconomist. His research 
revolves around the effects of fiscal policy, and 
makes use of both micro and macro data. Mario has 
investigated the effects of government spending in 
the US during times of uncertainty and recessions, 
and in particular how fiscal multipliers change at 
these times. In his job market paper, he analyses 
the effects of taxes on households’ mobility across 
the income distribution, finding that increases in 
marginal tax rates reduce the probability that 
SILVIA ALBRIZIO
International Economics Division
ADG International Affairs
SILVIA ALBRIZIO joined the International Affairs 
Department of the Banco de España in August 2016, 
after three years of experience at the Structural 
Policy Analysis Division of the OECD Economics 
Department, first in their Young Professionals 
Programme and then as a staff economist. She 
holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the European 
University Institute (Florence), an M.Sc. in Economics 
from Univ. Pompeu Fabra and an M.Sc. from Univ. 
Bocconi. She worked at the European Central Bank 
from 2006 to 2008 (Fiscal Policy Division, Financial 
Stability Division, and Financial Institutions and 
Market Statistics Division) as well as at the Asian 
Development Bank.
Silvia’s research interests range from fiscal policies 
to structural policies and macro-finance. The main 
chapter of her PhD thesis focuses on the effect of 
tax adjustments on firms’ planned investment, 
using a 40-year narrative of legislated tax changes 
in Germany. At the OECD she studied the effects of 
structural and environmental policies on firm and 
industry productivity, while at the ECB she wrote a 
special feature for the ECB Financial Stability 
Review on investors’ time-varying risk appetite.
Her current research projects focus on (i) fiscal 
multipliers and firm investment behavior, (ii) fiscal 
sustainability and (iii) the effects of unconventional 
monetary policy on investors’ expectations and 
portfolios (for the case of Japan). 
RESEARCH PAGE:  
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RODOLFO CAMPOS
International Economics Division
ADG International Affairs
Rodolfo’s research centers primarily on applied 
economic theory, macroeconomics, and financial 
economics. He is particularly interested in combining 
economic theory with empirical methods in order to 
conduct policy-relevant research. His current projects 
include research on consumption, prices, and 
unemployment. In one of his ongoing projects, he 
studies how the fact that the unemployed pay lower 
prices affects optimal unemployment insurance. In 
another project, he studies how to empirically 
separate the liquidity and moral hazard effects of 
unemployment insurance, and what this separation 
implies for the optimal degree of unemployment 
insurance in an environment where unemployment 
benefits vary over time, as is the case in Spain.
RESEARCH PAGE:  
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Rodolfo Campos joined the International Economics 
Division of the Banco de España in May 2016. Prior 
to joining the Banco de España, he was an Assistant 
Professor at IESE Business School, and spent six 
months as a visiting professor at CEMFI. Rodolfo 
obtained is Ph.D. in Economics from the University 
of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He holds an M.A. 
in Economics from UCLA, a postgraduate degree in 
Economics from Universidad Torcuato di Tella 
(Argentina) and an undergraduate degree in 
Economics from UCA (Argentina). Rodolfo has 
taught economics courses at the graduate and 
undergraduate levels in the subjects of game theory, 
microeconomics, macroeconomics, and 
international economics at various universities. He 
has also taught MBA courses and executive 
education courses on macroeconomics.
households move up or down to different income 
positions. In a recent project, Mario explores to 
what extent fiscal policy can affect the transmission 
of income status between generations.
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YULIYA KULIKOVA 
Microeconomi Analysis Divison
DG Economics, Statistics and Research
of the World Bank. During her studies she spent 
one semester at the W.P. Carey School of Business, 
Arizona State University, USA. She was also a 
teaching assistant in the UAB for macroeconomics, 
labor economics and econometrics, and a tutor in 
the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 
teaching basics of programming, econometrics, 
and mathematics and statistics reinforcement 
classes.
YULIYA KULIKOVA joined the Microeconomic Analysis 
Division of the Banco de España in September 
2016. She obtained her PhD degree from the 
International Doctorate in Economic Analysis of 
the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) in 
June 2016. Before starting her doctoral degree, 
she worked for three years at a financial company 
in Russia and was a short-term consultant for the 
Europe and Central Asia Human Development Unit 
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quantifies the role of the added-worker effect for 
unemployment in the U.S. Finally, she is interested 
in issues related to inequality and the role of health 
in the transmission of inequality across generations. 
To study the role of health policies for intergenerational 
income persistence in the U.S., she has developed 
and estimated a human-capital based overlapping 
generations model of household decisions that 
takes into account multidimensionality and the 
dynamic nature of human capital investments. She 
finds that health policies are important for the 
human capital accumulation of children and as a 
result, for intergenerational mobility, especially for 
the poorest families. Furthermore, Yuliya finds 
interactions between the effects of health and 
educational policies.
RESEARCH PAGE: 
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Yuliya’s interests lie within the fields of labor 
economics, family economics and health 
economics. One of her ongoing projects, “Marriage 
and Health: Selection, Protection, and Assortative 
Mating” was reviewed by The Economist and 
received attention in the Spanish media. In the 
project, she compares two possible explanations 
for the fact that married people are substantially 
healthier than non-married people: selection of 
healthier individuals into marriage, or the “protective” 
effect of marriage on one’s health. She finds that 
both effects are present, and that health differentials 
for the young are mostly explained by selection, 
while for older individuals the “protective” effect of 
marriage is important. 
Another direction of Yuliya’s research is the labor 
market dynamics of married couples. She finds 
evidence of coordination between spouses, and 
SERGIO MAYORDOMO 
Financial Analysis Division
DG Economics, Statistics and Research
SERGIO MAYORDOMO joined the Financial Analysis 
Division of the ADG Economics and Research in 
July 2016. Sergio obtained his Ph.D. in Finance 
from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. He also holds 
an M.Sc. degree in Economics and Finance from 
CEMFI. Before joining the Banco de España, Sergio 
was an Associate Professor at the Universidad de 
Navarra, and a research economist at the Spanish 
Securities Markets Commission (CNMV). Sergio 
has also held some visiting positions at the 
European Central Bank, the Univ. of Zurich, UCLA, 
and Columbia Business School.
Sergio’s lines of research include credit risk, credit 
derivatives, systemic risk, household finance, 
financial stability, and mutual funds. His most recent 
papers address topics such as firms’ access to 
finance, its cost, and the use of guarantees in loan 
contracts. His papers have been published in 
journals such as the Journal of Banking and Finance, 
Journal of Financial Stability, Journal of Empirical 
Finance, and Journal of International Money and 
Finance, among others. Among the grants and 
prizes Sergio has received is the 2012 Best Doctoral 
Thesis Award from the UCEIF Foundation, the 2014 
FEF Antonio Dionis Soler Research Prize, the V 
Prize UAM – Accenture, and the Best Paper Award 
of the AEFIN at the 2011 Edition of the Finance 
Forum, among others.
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LUNA ROMO GONZÁLEZ 
International Financial Markets Division
ADG International Affairs
MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ MORENO 
Macroprudential Policy Division
DG Financial Stability And Resolution
MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ MORENO joined the Financial Stability 
Department of the Banco de España in July 2016. 
María obtained her Ph.D. in Finance from Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid in April 2013. She also holds a 
M.Sc. degree in Business Economics and 
Quantitative Methods and a B.Sc. degree in 
Economics from Univ. Carlos III. Before joining the 
Banco de España, she worked for three years as an 
Assistant Professor at the Universidad de Navarra. 
During her Ph.D. studies, she was involved in a one-
year research program at the European Central Bank. 
María’s research focuses on systemic risk, banking, 
credit derivatives, bond markets, housing and 
portfolio choice. Her current work studies the 
impact of unconventional monetary policy on 
European sovereign bonds; the use and 
consequences of collateral requirements in firms’ 
financing; and the impact of the SME Supporting 
Factor introduced by the European Banking 
Authority on small and medium enterprises’ access 
to credit.
María has published research papers in the Journal 
of Banking and Finance, Journal of Financial 
Stability, International Review of Economics & 
Finance and Quantitative Finance. Among the 
grants and prizes she has received are the José 
Castillejo Grant for Young Ph.D.s in 2015, the 2014 
Best Doctoral Thesis Award from the UCEIF 
Foundation, the 2014 FEF Antonio Dionis Soler 
Research Prize, the V Prize UAM – Accenture, the 
Ph.D. Extraordinary Prize at Univ. Carlos III, and the 
Best Paper on Derivatives BME Award at the 2012 
edition of the Finance Forum.
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LUNA ROMO GONZÁLEZ joined the staff of the International 
Financial Markets Division of the Banco de España in 
May 2016 after working for several years in the same 
division as a Research Analyst and Research 
Assistant. Luna holds an MSc in Economics 
(International Economics and Finance track) from the 
University of Tilburg (The Netherlands), and BSc 
degrees in Economics and Law from the Universidad 
Carlos III (Madrid). During her formative years, she 
was the holder of the scholarship “Fundación Ramón 
Areces” for postgraduate studies abroad in social 
sciences, and was awarded several times with the 
Scholarship “Excelente de la Comunidad Autónoma 
de Madrid” for top grades in undergraduate studies. 
In 2013, she worked as a visiting Research Analyst in 
the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank 
for International Settlements in Basel. 
Luna’s research activity focuses on global capital 
markets and bank funding, concentrating in 
particular on foreign-currency funding by banks and 
covered bond markets. In her latest paper, she finds 
that European banks issued US dollar-denominated 
debt opportunistically in order to reduce funding 
costs by taking advantage of deviations from 
interest rate parity. In another paper, Luna and her 
co-authors investigate the determinants of overall 
bond issuance by European banks before and 
during recent financial crises. They find that banks 
sought to take advantage of low interest rates prior 
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to the crisis, but that country-risk characteristics 
became the main drivers of bond issuance 
thereafter. Luna is currently investigating yield 
differences between bonds issued by banks 
considered “too big to fail” and other banks.
CARLOS SANZ joined the Applied Microeconomics 
Division of the Banco de España in September 
2016. Carlos holds a Ph.D. in Economics from 
Princeton University (May 2016) and undergraduate 
degrees in Economics and Law from Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid (June 2011). His research 
interests are in public finance, political economy 
and applied microeconomics.
In his paper “The effect of electoral systems on 
voter turnout: Evidence from a natural experiment”, 
forthcoming in Political Science Research and 
Methods, he uses a regression discontinuity design 
and data from Spanish local elections to compare 
turnout under closed-list proportional representation 
and under an open-list, plurality-at-large system in 
which voters can vote for individual candidates 
from the same or different party-lists. He finds that 
the open-list system increases turnout by between 
1 and 2 percentage points, which suggests that 
introducing competition across and within parties 
leads to more voter turnout. 
In another project, Carlos compares economic 
policy in direct and representative democracy. 
Using data from the budgets of the municipal 
governments, he finds that direct democracy in the 
form of open town meetings leads to a smaller 
government, reducing public spending and 
revenues by around 8%.
Carlos is currently studying how the electoral 
system affects the process of legislative bargaining 
and government formation. In this and future 
research, he intends to provide more evidence to 
better understand how the political framework 
shapes economic policy and public finances. 
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CARLOS SANZ 
Microeconomic Analysis Division
DG Economics, Statistics and Research
DOMINIK THALER 
Monetary Policy Division
DG Economics, Statistics and Research
DOMINIK THALER joined the Monetary Policy Unit 
within the ADG Economics and Research of the 
Banco de España in September 2016. Dominik 
obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from the European 
University Institute (EUI) in Florence in October 
2016. He also holds an M.Res. in Economics from 
the EUI and a Diplom in Economics from the 
University of Freiburg. During his Ph.D. studies he 
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erode a country’s debt sustainability. To solve this 
model with nonlinear methods, he developed a 
state space reduction technique, which he 
discusses in a separate technical note. His job 
market paper analyzes how frictions in the financial 
sector can generate a link between monetary policy 
and risk-taking by banks. Furthermore, it shows 
how this link gives rise to a new and quantitatively 
significant trade-off for the monetary policy maker, 
which reduces the desirability of inflation 
stabilization. Dominik is currently working on a 
project to capture the notion of systemic financial 
sector risk in the context of a non-linear dynamic 
macro model.
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spent several months at the European Central Bank, 
at the National Bank of Belgium, and at the 
University of Pennsylvania.
Dominik’s research combines macroeconomic and 
financial theory with computational and empirical 
methods to address policy-relevant research 
questions. In one of his projects, Dominik explores 
the implications of the sovereign-bank nexus for 
debt sustainability. He shows that the exposure of 
credit-constrained domestic banks to sovereign 
debt can explain the output losses and the sovereign 
debt market shutdown associated with sovereign 
default. He argues that these costs generate the 
commitment necessary to sustain sovereign debt, 
and that regulation aiming at reducing banks’ 
exposure to domestic sovereign debt might thus 
REGULAR VISITING SCHOLARS
In addition to its regular staff and fixed-term visiting 
fellows, the Banco de España also maintains a 
program of regular visits by prestigious academic 
economists who participate actively in its research
•  JAVIER ANDRÉS (Univ. de Valencia),  
macroeconomics, monetary policy
•  JESÚS GONZALO (Univ. Carlos III de Madrid),  
time series econometrics
•  NEZIH GUNER (CEMFI),  
macroeconomics, demography
work, by collaborating in its research projects and its 
policy work as advisors and/or as co-authors. 
Currently, the following academics are regular 
visitors.
•  JOSE MARÍA LABEAGA (Univ. Nacional de Educación 
a Distancia),  
applied econometrics
•  SARA OTAL (Univ. de Alcalá),  
accounting
•  JOSÉ LUIS PEYDRÓ (Univ. Pompeu Fabra),  
applied financial economics
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 37 RESEARCH UPDATE, FALL 2016
the Banco de España, starting in September 2017 or 
thereafter for up to one year, to undertake research 
projects in applied economics. Fields of particular 
interest include macroeconomics; monetary policy; 
finance, banking and macroprudential policy; labor 
markets; international economics; and econometric 
analysis. 
The competition for these fellowships will be announced 
in early 2017 (typically in February) on the webpage of 
the Human Resources Department of the Banco de 
España, which will evaluate proposals submitted by 
interested economists.
Research vacancies page
UPCOMING CONFERENCES
LINK TO CONFERENCES PAGE
HOW MUCH OF A FISCAL UNION FOR THE EMU?
MAY 18-19, 2017
A central question in the development of Europe is how 
much of a Fiscal Union is needed to have a stable and 
resilient Euro Area and EU. This has been a recurrent 
question through the euro crisis, where the ECB has 
played a major role, like that played by the Fed during 
the financial crisis, although the latter could count on 
the backing of the US Treasury. Brexit and the current 
developments in the global economy (migration crisis, 
US elections, etc.) have exacerbated the need to 
address this question and find viable solutions for the 
EMU institutional framework. 
On Wednesday and Thursday, May 18-19, 2017, the 
Banco de España will host a conference organized by 
the Horizon 2020 Project ADEMU - “A Dynamic 
Economic and Monetary Union”, focusing on this 
RESEARCH JOB VACANCIES
LINK TO JOB OPENINGS PAGE
JOB OPENINGS FOR PH.D. ECONOMISTS
The Banco de España, the Spanish central bank, is 
interested in hiring experienced or newly qualified 
Ph.D.s in economics or related fields for its headquarters 
in Madrid. The areas of interest include monetary 
policy, international economics and macro-finance, 
banking and finance, industrial organisation, and 
applied micro- and macroeconomics. The main tasks 
of the potential candidates would be to conduct high-
quality policy-oriented research, to produce reports for 
the Bank’s senior management and to write for the 
Bank’s publications. Applicants would be expected to 
travel and participate in meetings organised by 
international institutions. Permanent or fixed-term full-
time contracts could be offered. A sound command of 
written and spoken Spanish will be highly valued. The 
Banco de España provides an excellent working and 
research environment. Salary and benefits are 
competitive.
Applicants should e-mail a CV, a sample of recent 
research and at least three references to the Head of 
the Training and Recruitment Division by 28 November 
2016. The actual letters of reference may be posted by 
ordinary mail.
  E-mail for information and applications:  
rho.investigacion-becas@bde.es.
  View our announcement at Job Openings for Economists. 
  View our announcement at Econ Job Market.
RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS IN ECONOMICS
In keeping with its commitment to grounding its policy 
work with state-of-the-art analysis, and its commitment 
to supporting economic research in Spain, the Banco 
de España will again in 2017 announce fixed-term 
positions for Resident Visiting Scholars. These 
contracts will support temporary visiting positions at 
ANNOUNCEMENTS
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FIRST CONFERENCE ON FINANCIAL STABILITY.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA – CEMFI
MADRID, 24-25 MAY 2017
The Banco de España,  together with the Centro de 
Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI), is starting 
a series of biennial conferences to promote research 
and discussion on topics related to financial stability 
among academics, practitioners, and policy-makers. 
The first conference will be held at the Banco de 
España’s headquarters in Madrid on 24-25 May 2017. 
Governor Luis M. Linde will open the conference and 
President Mario Draghi will be the keynote speaker. 
The conference will include a panel session on the 
topic “Spanish dynamic provisions in retrospect”. 
Submissions of theoretical or empirical papers related 
to financial stability are invited. Papers with a focus on 
the appropriate analytical frameworks and tools for 
macro-prudential policies to address systemic risk are 
especially welcome. Specific examples of relevant 
topics include analytical frameworks for macro-
prudential policy, impact analysis of macro-prudential 
tools, interactions between micro- and macro-
prudential tools, macro-prudential policy beyond 
banking, governance aspects of macro-prudential 
policy and digital banking and financial stability. The 
deadline for submissions is 28 February 2017. A call for 
papers will be distributed soon.
NEW FACES IN MACRO: MADRID WORKSHOP IN QUANTITATIVE 
MACROECONOMICS
MADRID, 29-30 MAY, 2017
The goal of this workshop is to provide a forum for 
junior economists based in Europe with a special 
interest in quantitative macroeconomics, and to 
establish an academic network among this group. 
The workshop will be jointly organized by the Banco de 
España and the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. A call 
for papers will be distributed soon.
FIRST ANNUAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE: POLICY CHALLENGES 
IN A LOW NOMINAL GROWTH ENVIRONMENT
MADRID, AUGUST 31 – SEPTEMBER 1, 2017
On August 31st and September 1st 2017, the Banco de 
España will host its First Annual Research Conference 
question, as well as on how it should be structured. 
The aim of the conference is to present and discuss 
current research on the topic and debate policy 
experiences and proposals. The conference will also 
discuss how the recent political events and current 
trends may affect the EMU fiscal and monetary 
framework. 
More detailed information regarding the call for papers 
and the relevant deadlines will be released soon in the 
ADEMU website (http://ademu-project.eu/) and also 
disseminated through the ADEMU newsletter.
25TH CEPR EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN 
INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMICS (ESSIM)
RODA DE BARÁ, TARRAGONA, 23-26 MAY 2017
The 25th CEPR European Summer Symposium in 
International Macroeconomics (ESSIM) will take place 
from Tuesday to Friday, May 23-26, 2017, at the Banco 
de España facilities in Tarragona, Spain. 
ESSIM is an annual meeting that brings together about 
75 economists from across Europe and key researchers 
from outside the region to focus on international 
economics and other areas of macroeconomics. It 
provides a unique opportunity for macroeconomists 
from different institutions and countries to discuss 
research, and for young researchers to meet and 
discuss their work with senior economists, combining 
workshop sessions with time for collaboration and 
consultation.
Sessions on Tuesday and Wednesday, May 23-24, will 
focus on the CEPR programme area of Monetary 
Economics and Fluctuations. Thursday and Friday, May 
25-26, will feature parallel sessions on the areas of 
International Money and Finance, and Macroeconomics 
and Growth. Confirmed speakers include Gianluca 
Violante (NYU), Emmanuel Farhi (Harvard) and Chang-
tai Hsieh (Chicago). The Banco de España residence 
will be open from Monday, May 22 until Saturday, May 
27, enabling participants to be present all day on the 
dates when they are taking part. 
The organizers of the conference will be Philippe 
Bacchetta (University of Lausanne and CEPR), 
Francesco Caselli (LSE and CEPR), Wouter den Haan 
(LSE and CEPR), and James Costain (Banco de España). 
The Call for Papers will be available soon at the CEPR 
website.
Link to CEPR events page
at its Madrid headquarters. The topic of the conference 
will be “Policy challenges in a low nominal growth 
environment”. 
In much of the industrialized world, including the euro 
area, the macroeconomic landscape is characterized 
by sluggish growth, inflation persistently below target, 
low interest rates (including short-term nominal rates 
close to their effective lower bounds), and increasing 
risks to financial stability. Against this background, 
economic policy-makers, including fiscal, monetary 
and macroprudential authorities, face the formidable 
challenge of promoting a faster economic recovery and 
the return of inflation to its target level, while ensuring 
financial stability. The aim of the conference is to bring 
together world-leading scholars and policy-makers in 
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order to discuss the causes of these macroeconomic 
developments and the policy measures to address 
them. Emmanuel Farhi, Jordi Galí, Gauti Eggertsson, 
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, Viral Acharya and Tano 
Santos have already confirmed their participation.
More generally, our Annual Research Conference is 
intended to become the Banco de España’s flagship 
research conference, and aims to reaffirm the Banco de 
España’s commitment to research as an indispensable 
tool for improving economic policy-making.
In addition, on August 30, 2017, the Banco de España 
will host a Day Ahead Conference providing a forum for 
research by central bank macroeconomists. A Call for 
Papers will be distributed soon.
